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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of the concepts of 
rationality, reasonableness, culpability and autonomy that inform and support our 
conception of both the person and the punishable subject. A critical discourse analysis 
tracing these concepts through both the law and psychological tools used to evaluate the 
fitness of a person reveals that these concepts and their implied values are inconsistently 
applied to the mentally disordered who come into conflict with the law. I argue that the 
result of this inconsistency compromises a person's autonomy which is a contradiction to 
this concept as a foundational principle of the law. Ultimately, this thesis does not 
provide a solution to be employed in policy making, but its analysis leaves open 
possibilities for further exploration into the ways legal and social justice can be 
reconciled. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction: 
The fascination of popular culture with the criminal justice system and the issues 
it addresses tends to suggest that justice is about properly punishing individuals who 
cause harm. The proliferation of storylines that deal with clever serial killers, mass 
murderers, and the mentally disturbed in movies like Silence of the Lambs and Copycat, 
fictional television shows like Law and Order and CSI: Crime Scene Investigations, and 
in documentaries like American Justice and Crime Stories, creates a sense of urgency that 
social life is dangerous and needs to be rigidly controlled. Moreover, the image of 
infamous characters, like Hannibal Lecter, helps to reinforce their deviant status as moral 
monsters lurking in the shadows. 
The concern of this thesis developed out of an initial interest in the criminal law 
and how it punishes, how we determine who is to be punished, why, and how criminal 
justice intersects with social justice. A specific focus on the "insanity defence" developed 
out of an investigation into the justification for punishment and an interest in how the law 
" deals with criminals who deviate from common conceptions of them (i.e. as rational 
actors). Popular sentiment towards the insanity defence seems to construe it as a way of 
"getting away with a crime", and avoiding accountability and culpability for a criminal 
action. This sentiment seems particularly strong when the case is well publicized and 
especially heinous.} 
1 For instance, in late July 2008, a man stabbed and beheaded a fellow passenger aboard a Greyhound bus 
headed for Winnipeg, Manitoba. On March 5, 2009, the outcome of the trial for the accused was published 
as he was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder. The victim's family thinks that 
this man "got away" with his crime since he will be serving his time in a mental institution instead of a 
prison and will have no criminal record (Associated Press, 2009). 
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Punishment has a significant role in criminal justice, and has been historically 
justified by three main principles: deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. These 
justifications are based on some fundamental assumptions about what the criminal is, 
specifically, a choice maker who must be held accountable for his actions? Historically, 
it has been claimed that a person who cannot comprehend his criminal acts, their 
magnitude, or their consequences because of mental disorder/disease (that prevents him 
from being a rational actor) should not be held criminally responsible for those actions.3 
Moreover, the goals of punishment are thwarted by this kind of accused person. First, the 
accused cannot be deterred by punishment because he does not comprehend what he did 
as wrong. Second, he cannot understand why he is being punished or that he is being 
punished, so the goal of retribution is futile. Finally, while rehabilitation assumes that 
forces beyond the control of the individual are the cause of her behaviour, the failure to 
comprehend the meaning of an act as wrong can also render futile the goal of 
rehabilitation as efforts to correct wrong behaviour will not be appreciated. 
" As a result, the following questions arise: how does the law deal with the mentally 
disordered? What happens when the mentally disordered come into contact with the law? 
Is the response of the law a just one? The mentally disordered person who is unable to be 
held criminally accountable for his actions and hence punished, may nonetheless still be 
thought of as a threat to society for what he has done in the past and, in some cases, for 
the level of risk he poses still. The law's recognition of the potential threat results in 
detainment or containment in psychiatric facilities where treatment may be a part of the 
2 In order to overcome sexist language, I will use the pronOlIDs him, her, he, she, etc., interchangeably 
throughout the course of this paper. 
3 This idea can be traced to Beccaria (1880) who states that punishment should be less severe for youth and 
the insane. 
6 
sentence regiment. This detainment is a way of segregating populations considered 
deviants from society to protect the social order and to keep normative behavioural 
standards from being questioned or changed (Arrigo, 2003). The implication of this kind 
of control is an emphasis on fundamental concepts of rationality, reasonableness, self 
constraint and impulse control. These values have been passed down to us from the 
Enlightenment4 and are maintained by the legal and psychiatric institutions working in 
tandem. 
Discovering this response provoked investigation into psychiatry and psychology 
in the sphere of criminal justice in order to ascertain their role in the course of the law 
and how their presence is felt in criminal law. In his book, Insanity on Trial, Norman 
Finkle (1988) provides an examination of the historic development of the "insanity 
defence," the role of psychology in the law and its tensions. Finkle (1988) dedicates a 
single chapter to the idea of competence to stand trial. The issue of competence to stand 
trial is both intimately bound to the "insanity defence" and quite distinct from it. Both of 
these legal issues deal with persons who are mentally disordered and/or diseased, but the 
focus of the "insanity defence" is about whether or not the accused person understood 
what he was doing when the crime was committed, while the issue of competency is 
focussed on whether or not the accused can participate adequately in his trial. 
Canadian literature in the area of psychology and the law refers to competency to 
stand trial as fitness to stand trial. In general, these terms are equivalent and used 
interchangeably by authors who are writing for both an American and Canadian audience 
4 This era of thought sought to account for behaviour by investigating actual causes mther than 
supernatural. "the philosophes [in this era] were advocates of a new faith in reason, toleration, materialism 
and empiricism" (Deutschmann 1994, p.99). 
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(see for instance Zap( 2001, Roesch, et al., 1999, Arrigo, 2003). Fitness to stand trial 
became an important focus because it is the first point of contact the courts have with an 
accused individual and the determination of fitness or unfitness has important 
ramifications for the course of the judicial process of the accused. The concept of fitness 
embodies several significant ideas about the punishable subjectS and, in Canada, the legal 
criteria about who is fit are found in the Criminal Code. Literature in this area seems to 
have two main focuses. On the one hand, there is an attempt to demonstrate the 
usefulness of psychological tools designed to assess trial fitness (for instance, Zap( 1999; 
Golding, et al. 1984; Bagby, et al. 1992) and an intense critique of them (Veiel & Coles, 
1999, 2001). On the other hand, there are general examinations of the legal processes of 
questioning fitness and the consequences of being found unfit (Verdun-Jones, Simon N, 
1981; Davis, Simon 1994, Arrigo, 2003). 
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of the concepts of 
rationality, reasonableness, culpability and autonomy that inform our conception of both 
" 
the person and the punishable subject, and how these concepts inform both th~ law and its 
evaluation of the mentally disordered accused who stand before it. I argue that these 
concepts are important Western values that are inconsistently applied to the accused 
whose fitness for trial is questionable. This inconsistency sterns from a lowering of 
standards that are normally implied by these values to create punishable subjects. The 
result is to process accused individuals through the court system even though they might 
not have an adequate understanding of that procedure or be able to act in their own best 
interests. 
5 An exploration of these ideas to come. 
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This study is an examination of the way that Canadi,an law and legal institutions 
deal with accused offenders and how legal institutions rely on and reinforce fundamental 
concepts to evaluate and determine how accused offenders should be handled as they face 
the judicial process. Specifically, I explore how accused offenders are sorted by 
determinations of trial fitness, a conceptual construct employed by the legal institution 
during the initial stages of judicial processing. This process is justified by the legal 
institution as a way ofpreventing an accused person from unfair trial proceedings (Davis, 
1994, p. 319). Briefly, in order to be fit for trial, an accused person must be able to 
understand and comprehend the proceedings of a trial, its potential consequences, and be 
able to assist in her own defence (Viljoen, Roesch, Ogloff, & Zapf, 2003, p. 369). 
On Conceiving Justice: 
Starting with the premise that both criminal and social justice have something in 
common - the idea and pursuit of justice - this thesis makes distinctions between them in 
order to understand where they intersect and diverge. This theoretical exercise is 
" '" 
important because it seems that popular ideas of justice tend to conflate them when two 
branches of justice are not necessarily congruent with one another. 
The general concept of justice can be broadly conceived as having an ethical or 
moral underpinning that makes the distinction between right and wrong meaningful. 6 
Criminal justice, however, tends to concern itself with controlling social activities to 
maintain social order7, and sees itself as providing the greatest good for the greatest 
6 From here on, I will use the words moral and ethical interchangeably. 
7 See for instance, Garland (1990) Punishment and Modem Society p. 57. 
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number - a utilitarian perspectives. Moreover, the criminalj,ustice system understands 
itself to be the enforcer ofmorals9 (presumably provided by a populous and enacted by 
representative officials on behalf of the public) and part of its role is to mete out 
punishments to those who deviate from or violate those morals by harming others in 
some way. This conception of societal functions stems from the idea that people are 
bound by a social contract - one that prevents them from exacting their own justice in 
exchange for the protection from a collective body (Locke, 1995, pp. 350-352). 
Broadly conceived, social justice is an attempt to alleviate (or eliminate) inequity 
among individuals and groups in a community (regardless of size), whether they are 
issues of redistribution (of goods) or of recognition (of status of some kind).l0 Given this 
conception of social justice and the definition of criminal justice above, it is not obvious 
that these two branches of justice are congruent. The utilitarian principle that informs 
criminal justice presumes inequalities within society and this presumption does not seem 
compatible with the concerns of social justice. How can these differences be reconciled? 
,-
" The answer lies with the connection these concepts have to the ethical realm. Thus it is 
necessary to analyse how social justice is connected to the ethical by way of a brief 
overview of its development as a concept. Outlining the notion of social justice will also 
demonstrate the development of important concepts like rationality, equality, and 
8 The philosophy of utilitarianism and its use in law is put forth by Jeremy Bentham in his work 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Bentham, 178912000). The idea of Utilitarianism 
is later refmed by John stuart Mill and revisited in contemporary literature by John Rawls. These ideas are 
discussed below. 
9 F or example, "Durkheim conceives of punishment as a straightforward embodiment of society's moral 
order..." (Garland, 1990, p.25). 
10 See for example Iris Young (1997) and Nancy Fraser (1995) for developments of this conception of 
social justice. For instance, Fraser (1995) is interested in the relationship between recognition and 
redistribution because she thinks that they are fundamental to the idea of justice; justice cannot be achieved 
without including them both. Young (1997) argues from a position that both recognizes the importance of 
recognition and redistribution, but thinks that it is necessary to pluralize categories to "[diffuse] the 
starkness of redistribution ... " 
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autonomy. It will also show how these concepts are employed in the construction of the 
person as a punishable subject and his connections to being responsible and culpable for 
his actions and behaviours. This kind of overview is best executed by examining some 
key philosophical theories about justice. 
A Brief History of the Development of Social Justice: 
Prior to Adam Smithll, distributive justice was not considered an issue of justice 
at all. The poor were conceived of as inferior and their plight was, in some respects, 
considered a divine ordinance, or a part of God's hierarchical plan for human beings. Any 
attempt to relieve the suffering of the poor was regarded as interfering with God's plans. 
As a result of this way of thinking, relief efforts became the responsibility of the Church 
and private individuals who used the task of nominally assisting those who suffered as an 
opportunity for their own moral benefit. Smith (1789/2000) has been credited with 
arguing that the poor were just as capable as the well off to make respectable decisions, 
Smith "was a virulent opponent of the notion that the poor are inferior in any 'o/ay to the 
,'" 
well off' (Flieschaker, 2004, p.65). 
11 Adam Smith is best known for his work about the economy, The Wealth ojNations, but he also wrote 
extensively about moral philosophy and advocated a view of humans that equalizes them despite material 
wealth. He suggests.inA Theory ojMoral Sentiments that, "When he views himself.in the light.in which he 
is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect 
better than any other in it." This recognition is what Smith thinks accounts for sentiments of shame and 
remorse after the .infliction of injustice upon another. Moreover it is also the equalizing force that allows 
individuals to let each other carryon .in their own pursuits uninterrupted unless that pursuit causes harm to 
another person. The difference between people is thought to be the product of culture and education. Smith 
writes.in The Wealth ojNations, "The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a 
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, 
custom, and education" (Smith, 1789/2000). 
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Building on these arguments for the equality of people at a basic level, Immanuel 
Kant's moral theory specifically "proclaims the equal moral worth of all human beings" 
(Flieschaker, 2004, p.73) and that they are morally equal because they are rational beings. 
This claim sets up a theory of morality that calls for people to treat one another as ends in 
themselves and not merely as means to an end. The Categorical Imperative specifically 
calls for actions to be performed from a sense of duty rather than any kind of emotion or 
volition (Kant, 1988, p.25). The problem with "charity from inclination" according to 
Kant is that it results in a hierarchy between the giver and the recipient where the giver 
gets a sense of self worth at the expense of the recipient.12 Charity from inclination is no 
virtue at all for Kant because it does not promote" ... a community of equal rational 
beings, a community that respects the equal absolute worth of every individual within it." 
(Flieschaker, 2004, p.72) This conception provides the foundation for secular justice, and 
Kant's careful articulation of the equality of all rational beings is the principle that is 
most relied upon for the grounding of theories of justice. 13 
In contrast to Kant's ideas about intention and duty as requirements for koral 
actions is the Utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism is most interested in whether human good 
in general is promoted by principles ofvirtues.14 If human good is not promoted, then 
those virtues can be rejected. John Stuart Mill (2000) addressed the issue of how 
utilitarianism can account for justice in its schema He argued that justice is the most 
basic utility that must be fulfilled before any other type of utility (as cited in Mill, 2000, 
12 This idea is later picked up on by Derrida (1992) who claims that a gift can never be recognized as such 
because to recognize a gift as such puts into play power structures. 
19 See also Kant, 1988, P 60. 
14 "The equal claim of everybody to happiness, in the estimation of the moralist and of the legislator, 
involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human 
life and the general interest in which that of every individual is included set limits to the maxim; and those 
limits ought to be strictly construed" (Mill, 2000, p. 173). 
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p. 172). But justice has been contrasted with utility (i.e. human good in general) precisely 
because justice is thought to deal with individual rights. In his critique, Flieschaker 
(2004) writes, "[j]ustice is supposed to protect individual human beings against being 
sacrificed for any societal greater good" (Flieschaker, 2004, p.l08). Moreover, 
utilitarianism is a teleological philosophy that measures the good by the end result of an 
action and not by the actor's intentions. Ifwe stretch the membership of those people 
involved in the utilitarian calculus to include the future, what is judged to be good in the 
present is not necessarily going to be viewed this way in the future and therefore 
rectification becomes a problem. Additionally, the telo/5 is never achieved if we include 
the future, so there are no grounds on which to judge the goodness of acts or for 
evaluating proposals to solve problems. 
John Rawls, following many of his predecessors, rejects the idea of morals as 
having a divine nature. Instead, he sees them as products of human society. Rawls' 
emphasis on the individual leads him to reject the utilitarian project16 to show that there 
" ,i' 
can be separate systems of ends. For Rawls, 'justice ought to be concerned with the 
distribution of 'primary goods' - goods that are necessary for the pursuit of practically 
every human end ... " (Flieschaker, 2004, p. 111). The ultimate principles to determine the 
good in Rawls' work are rationally chosen by group members who are unaware of their 
social position, gender, material wealth, et cetra (the veil of ignorance). Rawls suggests 
that people are fundamentally self interested ("rational and mutually disinterested") so 
principles chosen from this exercise will be chosen by people who hypothesize 
15 Telos means end. 
16 "I shall maintain instead that the persons in the initial situation would choose two rather different 
principles [instead of utility]: the frrstrequires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while 
the second holds that social and economic inequalities ... are just only if they result in compensating 
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society" (Rawls, 2004, p. 54). 
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themselves to be the least well off not knowing their actual situations (Rawls, 2004, p. 
53). Rawls' achievement then is to precisely articulate what is meant by justice, and he 
defines what goods should be distributed and why. One of the problems with Rawls' 
theory is that it already presumes a liberal democracy and does not alleviate the suffering 
of those who really are the least well off. 
Despite 1he criticisms of1he Modem project17, Jurgen Habermas (1980/1997) 
attempted to extend it via a notion of communicative ethics. He suggests that justice can 
be produced through communication which will allow Man to both retain his 
individualism and also to come to a consensus without losing his autonomy in a group 
dynamic. Communication as a rational activity performed by equals to come to a 
consensus is an "ideal speech" situation and what Habermas thinks will result in social 
justice. This attempt is a way to resolve the conflict between deontological and 
teleological ideas about justice. But Habermas' emphasis on rationality is problematic for 
it suggests a way of developing thought in a specific pattern so as to use the force of 
" " argumentation to persuade others to accept propositions (Love, 1989, p. 273). The 
development of this method hinges on accepting traditional Western ideas oflogic, 
rationality, and argumentation. While a group may be able to develop its own accepted 
way of achieving an ideal speech situation, this achievement will not necessarily apply by 
extension on a global scale. This inapplicability leads to cultural relativism and does not 
resolve issues of inequality or inequity as communicative ethics breaks down. 
17 The Modern project, or Modernity, is one that embraces science and rationality as ways to solve the 
various problems facing humankind since the world is thought to be knowable and controllable. It suggests 
that there are in fact universals that can be discovered using science, reason and logic and that the world 
can be classified, ordered and measured. Contrast this understanding to the postmodern project which 
rejects the idea that there are universals to be discovered by reason and is suspicious of claims that suggest 
reason is the only way to progress and know the world. Postmodemism suggests that knowledge of "facts" 
is relative to individual histories. 
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. This briefand simplified outline of the history of distributive (social) justice 
provides a foundation upon which criticisms of Modernity's ideas about human nature 
and justice are built. The theorists outlined above have found some way of dealing with 
problems of ethics that plague theories of justice. Most of them hinge on the Kantian 
conception of people with equal moral worth. While Kant's moral theory seems to avoid 
the power structure pitfall common to other Modem justice projects, his moral theory 
hinges on a conception of a community of rational beings and the Categorical Imperative 
can only be undertaken by said beings. Given that these various social justice theories 
have some kind of ethical component, it is untenable to divorce ethics from the notion of 
justice despite their shortcomings. 
Iris Young (1990) provided a scathing critique of Enlightenment principles that 
have thus far been thought to be foundational for moral and social justice theories. Young 
broadens the scope of social justice from the distributional paradigm to one of 
recognition, focusing on domination and oppression. Rather than conceptualizing the 
plurality of social life as ultimately stemming from the universal- the logic of identity -
Young demonstrates the problems with such thinking. She writes, 
The logic ofidentity ... [is] an urge to think things together ... 
to conceptualize entities in terms of substance instead of 
process or relation '" The logic ofidentity constructs 
totalizing systems in which the unifYing categories are themselves 
unified under one first principle (Young, 1990, p. 98). 
Thus, according to Young, the logic of identity leaves no room for difference; rather it 
forces binaries that become hierarchal as they become associated with good and bad. The 
criticism of the logic of identity demonstrates the failure of the Modem ethics. Modem 
ethics stems from a theory ofan "ideal of impartiality" whose foundation is the logic of 
15 
identity. This ideal of impartiality as an arche suggests that .all rational subjects can apply 
moral principles in a fashion that is uncompromised by difference. That is, moral 
principles are decided upon and applied in a manner that is objective. This application is 
thought to be just because it treats individuals using the same basic formulas so no one 
finds himself or others treated in an exceptional manner. The law works in a similar 
fashion, by presuming both the innocence and fitness of those over whom it governs. 18 
This criticism of social justice by Young is one that will be returned to in the next 
section. 
TheorylMethodology: 
This discussion of social justice history, while brief, provides a foundation to 
examine criminal justice conceptions and processes. I suggest here that criminal justice 
and the law have traditionally rested upon an "ideal of impartiality" and have 
endeavoured to treat punishable subjects in a manner that is uniform. Like crimes are 
thought to receive like penalties and precedent setting rulings are hard fought and won. 
~t' 
'" 
Criminal justice is founded on the dichotomy of right and wrong, and/or good and bad for 
it is designed to deal with people who fail to behave in socially acceptable ways. 
Criminal justice purports to uphold the good, protect victims, and punish those who 
inflict harm within a community and it does so because it stems from both retributive and 
18 Not only does the law presume certain basic characteristics of those people over whom it governs, but its 
ability as a set ofrules by which people agree to be bound stems from the idea of a social contract of sorts. 
Thus the discussion of the idea of a social contract above is an important setting for an investigation into 
the power of the law and its functions. Markus Dubber (1998) traces the developments in the attempt to 
justify the state's power to punish if the social contract is entered into by rational persons who agree to 
limit their behaviours in exchange for state protection. He writes, "Since the social contract was said to 
originate from the recognition by rational persons that they would stand a better chance of developing their 
capacities in a cooperative system than in a war of all against all, there was something odd about the need 
to enforce rational rules against rational persons" (Dubber, 1998, p. 114). He points out that "the moral and 
political theory of the Enlightenment, in short, rested on the autonomy of abstractly identical rational 
persons" (Ibid.). I explore the concepts of rationality and autonomy later in this paper. 
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utilitarian principles. It is designed as a way to ultimately socially control people and as a 
result, it sets up definitions or categories of normative behaviour based on principles that 
are thought to lead to the greatest good. The utilitarian motivation of the criminal justice 
system does not concern itself with remedying the broader social ills that may cause 
people to tum to criminal behaviour, and so it can be argued that the goals of criminal 
justice are contrary to those of social justice. 
At a broad level, this project is an exploration of this contrast. I have chosen a 
specific and limited field of inquiry, focusing on fitness and peripherally, the discourse of 
insanity. The limitation of the focus of this inquiry is not mean to suggest that other 
forms of inequality do not impact the justice system. Other inequalities within the justice 
system such as race, class, ethnicity, and gender present challenges in reconciling 
criminal and social justice19. Moreover, the limited site of this inquiry is not to suggest 
that these various other inequalities do not impact on the unfit in additional ways20. Thus, 
this study contributes, more broadly, to our understanding of inequalities within criminal 
justice and social justice. This field of inquiry allows for an investigation oflegal, social, 
and psychiatric discourses with an emphasis on their language in order to understand the 
way the punishable subject is constructed. As constructs, the concepts of fitness and 
insanity have content that is subject to vagueness and interpretation, and which may be 
used to marginalize populations considered deviant, in need of control, or threatening. 
Focusing on the way language is used in this context reveals the way deviance is 
19 See for example: (WortleY,1996) (R. v. Gladue, 1999) 
20 "Intersectionality recognizes that systems ofpower such as race, class, and gender do not act alone to 
shape our experiences but rather, are multiplicative, inextricably linked, and simultaneously experienced" 
(Burgess-Proctor, 2006, p. 31). 
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determined21 and that the medicalization of deviance22 is pot~ntially detrimental to the 
notion of social justice. Language is the way we express our ideas, beliefs, and 
perceptions about the world. Richard Quinney puts it succinctly: "As human beings we 
construct a language of communication charged with the moral meaning of our being. 
The categories of human language contain and presuppose definite forms oflife" 
(Quinney, 1999, p. 74). 
The way that language conveys the meanings of these constructed concepts (of 
fitness, insanity, rationality etc.), and informs the tools used to measure them, lacks 
scholarly investigation in the Canadian context. Influenced by work done in this area in 
the American context, I provide a critical analysis of fitness within the Canadian Criminal 
Justice System. Taking a cue from Bruce Arrigo (1993, 2003), it is necessary to 
investigate these concepts in order to understand how they label and categorize people 
and approach them as punishable subjects. Arrigo's approach to psychological 
jurisprudence has taken a critical stance that demonstrates how binaries like heath/illness, 
normal/abnormal, and competent! incompetent are constructed and that one of them is 
privileged. The result is a revelation of the way "in which narratives are pre-reflectively 
constructed, reinforced and legitimized" (Arrigo, 2003, p. 57). This investigation into 
21 Garland notes that criminal law establishes categories of persons like that of "the degenerate," "the 
feeble-minded," and "the psychopath" which define an "extended range of deviant or patholog~cal 
subjectivities" and these categories "subtly modifY our conceptions of the norm from which they deviate ... 
These images of the defective self which are now projected by penal practice (as well as by psychiatry .. .) 
have contributed to the modern tendency to view the self as a machinery to be maintained and repaired by 
specialists and to rethink what was once known 'evil' in terms of pathology rather than moral 
choice.(Garland, 1990, p. 270-1). 
22 The approach of psychology to deviance "centred the source of deviance within the individual rather than 
the context [as opposed to the sociological approach]. The need was for treatment or transformation 
(Duguid, 2000, p. 28). Given these conceptions of the criminal deviant, it is not surprising that penal 
practice turned towards the medical modeL Duguid notes, "the psychologically driven medical model was 
designed to correct in order that the prisoner could gain sufficient insight into his or her actions to be 
trusted once again in society" (Duguid, 2000, p. 52). 
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binaries has been touched on above in my discussion of Iris Young's criticism of 
Modernity's conception of social justice. 
In order to cany out my analysis I will employ a critical discourse analysis. This 
methodology allows for a demonstration of the structures of power embedded in legal and 
psychiatric discourses about how the punishable subject should be approached. As noted 
above, criminal justice is already embedded in a binal)' of good and bad, right and wrong, 
and it further develops binaries by employing an ideal of impartiality. It leads us to 
simplify human nature and the policies designed to control it. Simply put, "wicked people 
exist - nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent people" (Quinney, 1999, p. 
80). 
But the criminal justice system has already found that impartiality is unrealistic -
it cannot apply itself to those subjects who do not meet specific criteria The criminal 
justice system is designed to deal with rational and "response-able" actors,23 and it must 
sort them from those who are not. Hence binaries of normalcy and deviance, mad and 
p 
'" 
bad, fit and unfit are posited. But while the language of these categories is appealing on 
the surface, its deeper meanings reveal what biases and/or power structures are at the 
foundation by examining the way legal and psychiatric institutions work together. The 
punishable subject is already defined by specific discourses about morality, normative 
behaviour and the like, and it is further refined upon entering the judicial system. A fit 
person goes to trial without delay, but the unfit subject is diverted to the psychiatric 
23 Labelling theorists make use of the idea of a "response-able" actor. As Ericson (1975) points out, "Hence 
it is not only a man's external behaviour which must be considered but his awareness of that behaviour, his 
interpretation of it, and his pmposes for engaging in it" (Ericson, 1975). In other words, in order to be 
"response-able" a person's actions are viewed in light of his ability to understand, engage in, and respond 
to his environment. 
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system. Being constructed as unfit has several consequences, for the individual, the 
system, and society, and it will be by examining this concept in depth, that these 
consequences will be made clearer. 
The examination of binaries is part of a technique known as deconstruction. 
Jacques Derrida used this method to "show contradictions that are structured into the 
various dichotomies that enable a text to make its claims, deconstruction challenges a 
text's authority and coherence" (cited in Carroll, 2004, p.226). Moreover, the importance 
of employing "Derridian deconstruction, [is that it] helps expose the cultural roots of 
intolerance that breed and sustain misguided policies, procedures, and practice in civil 
and criminal mental health laws" (Arrigo, 2003, p. 57). 
The post-modem project in the realm of the ethical is uncomfortable at best. The 
fluidity of meaning and the lack of uniformity reveal the chaotic nature of the world. The 
post-modem project of deconstruction ensures that all discourse is undertaken critically. 
Institutional practices become subject to scrutiny, judged by an (im)possible jqstice so 
'" 
that they may be reconfigured, redefined, and reorganized in their purposes - answering 
the call from the Other to recognize injustices and indifference.24 In other words, the 
structures and policies that are practiced by institutions like the legal and the psychiatric 
are rethought. What is often taken for granted as common sense, best practice, and 
24 "One sees this in the Derridian declaration that, 'Deconstruction is justice: but also in his cautioning that 
one can neither speak directly about nor experience justice. In answering the sense of responsibility to 
otherness, one serves justice but one does so with a sense of the infinite, open ended characteristics of the 
task" (as cited in Harvey, 1993, p. 51). 
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nonnative is evaluated with a critical lens to see just where ~uch policies and practices 
can lead us, who they affect, and whether those consequences are justified. 25 
In the context of this investigation, I take three discourses, the rational, the 
reasonable and the culpable and trace them through the legal system and the psychiatric 
system as it pertains to the legal. As dominant features of social life, the legal and the 
psychiatric institutions play significant roles in the fonnation and shaping of our ideas 
about who the punishable are, who the insane are, and who deserves to be held 
accountable for behaviour. Discourse analysis is an appropriate tool for this project 
because it reveals the power oflanguage to construct reality (or to provide us with a sense 
of pennanence). I have selected these concepts because they have a history associated 
with our understanding of the idea of the person. I argue that the construction of the 
punishable subject comes from the discourses of rationality, reasonableness, and 
culpability working in unison. As the law governs the citizens of a community, it 
fundamentally assumes that all those whom it oversees share the same basic qualities and 
are thus equally accountable to it. So, the citizen is constructed as "nonnal" o:"fit" by 
the assumption of the abilities that demarcate qualities of rationality and reasonableness. 
I will demonstrate this assumption in Chapter 2 and follow its importance 
throughout the course of this thesis. Once I establish the ideas embedded in these 
concepts I discourses, I show in Chapter 3 how they are reinforced by the psychiatric 
system by examining how they can be found in a tool designed to evaluate the way 
25 "It follows then, that deconstruction as applied to psychological jurisprudence, can expose the often-
hidden biases, unstated assumptions, and unconscious preferences located within the simplest of practices 
(i.e. hierarchical oppositions). To this end, deconstructive practice as a method of critical inquiry, 'reveals 
and decentres although incompletely and temporarily ... how legal arguments often disguise ideological 
positions" (Arrigo, 2003, p. 62). 
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accused offenders fit these criteria. Chapter 4 is an overview of two precedent setting 
cases in Canadian legal history (R v. Taylor and R v. Whittle) that I analyze to further 
show how these discourses play in the shaping oflegal strategies and practices. In 
Chapter 5, I select a few cases that have come before the Supreme Court of Canada after 
Taylor and Whittle to examine the consequences as they are practiced following these 
precedents. Finally, I speculate on the issues raised here and what they might mean for 
the pursuit of justice - social and criminal. Ifnothing else, the contribution of this project 
will be to reopen this topic for more public discussion in a Canadian specific context. 
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Chapter 2: The Development of the Discourses of the Rational, Reasonable and 
Culpable 
An understanding of the way accused offenders are moved through the criminal 
justice system needs to begin on the foundation of some of its fundamental principles and 
assumptions about the human condition. These principles and assumptions about human 
nature have a significant impact on the way accused offenders are navigated through the 
criminal justice system and provide guidelines for assessing the status and characteristics 
of an accused person. This chapter is an examination of the way that accused offenders 
are detennined to be fit for trial and how the discourses of rationality, reasonableness, 
autonomy and culpability play significant roles in the shaping of the fit and the 
punishable subject. These discourses set up an understanding of humans as having static, 
measurable and binmy characteristics of free/determined (autonomy), responsible/not 
responsible (culpable), thinking! not thinking (rational), and reasonable/unreasonable. 
The law understands its subjects to be fit by assuming them to be free, thinking, 
" 
reasonable and responsible choice-making agents26. More specifically, I argue that these 
discourses are unconsciously at work in and through the law and that the response of the 
law, despite its claim to accommodate difference, results in widening the scope of these 
discourses and encompasses as many punishable subjects as possible. This response 
results in a clash between the fundamental principles of autonomy and welfare. 
Criminal laws are designed to regulate social life. The legal system claims that it 
is interested in fairness and that to try a person who is incapable of comprehending the 
26 " .•. this constantly reiterated proposition - that individuals are free subjects and responsible for what they 
do - is a cultural message of immense power, and one which remains in place today" (Garland, 1990, p. 
270). 
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proceedings ofa trial or its consequences would be a dismal failure to uphold the fairness 
principle. In Cooper v. The Queen (1979), the Supreme Court of Canada decided that to 
appreciate an act, one must have an understanding of the consequences of that act. 
Moreover, it was in this case that "disease of the mind" was given explicit definition, and 
that this concept is specifically, a legal one. Justice Dickson stated in Cooper v. The 
Queen (1979), "The guilt of offending against any law whatsoever, necessarily supposing 
a wilful disobedience, can never justly be imputed to those who are either incapable of 
understanding it or of conforming themselves to it" (Cooper v. The Queen, 1979, p. 15 at 
#52). Moreover, the goals of punishment are thwarted by the actor who is insane 
(mentally diseased / disordered) because he is incapable of appreciating not only the 
punishment being imposed, but also the wrongness of the action to begin with. 
As noted by Meyers, "a competent defendant's comprehension of why he is being 
punished makes the punishment more just" (Meyers, 1997, p. 1017). The justness of 
punishing a fit defendant comes from an understanding that the defendant is a rational 
" " 
actor who has made a decision and now bears out the consequences of it. The law brings 
the wrongness of the defendant's act to his consciousness through punishment and can 
also then act as a means for rehabilitation. An unfit or incompetent defendant is thought 
to be incapable of rational thought and therefore his punishment fails to ensure his 
recognition of the wrongness of his actions. Without a consciousness of that wrongness, 
rehabilitation is thwarted. Accused persons are presumed fit for trial unless otherwise 
indicated and then they are evaluated for their ability to meet fitness standards. The 
presumption of fitness by the law is one way that it can justify its ability to punish and is 
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also a way of treating equally the persons who come before it. The psychiatric system has 
been called upon to assess these qualities in an accused person. 
Understanding the concepts offitness and insanity (mental disease/disorder) 
requires a deconstruction of the underlying discourses upon which these concepts are 
built: rationality, responsibility, and culpability. These concepts identifY specific 
characteristics of the actions performed by the punishable subject. If an actor is assumed 
to be rational and responsible, then he can be held culpable for actions that are harmful to 
others. These concepts are not only used in the legal realm, but also in the moral realm to 
help enforce and inform acceptable and regulated behaviour. These key concepts have far 
reaching implications for accused persons and how they are approached by the criminal 
justice system. They assume that all persons share specific qualities that make them 
members of a community. These assumed qualities also make community members 
identical, an assumption that is fundamental to the idea of justice. Therefore, when an 
actor is faced with criminal justice proceedings, he is already assumed to be of equal 
," 
status to the rest of the community members unless that equivalent status is ch~l1enged in 
some way?7 
The Principle of Autonomy: 
27 Of course, as Markus Dubber (1998) points out, there is a development in the rehabilitation movement of 
the late 18th century that viewed a person's criminal behaviour as indicative of difference. He points out 
that Fichte thought the criminal is irrational and by his behaviour identifies himself as inferior and in need 
of some form of rehabilitation in order to be reintegrated into the community (of rational actors to whom 
the social contract applies). 
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Before examining the historical development of the insanity defence and the 
development of the concept of "fitness" (or competence28), an overview of the broad 
principles of the criminal justice system is necessary as these principles inform and 
underscore the concepts of rationality, responsibility and culpability. One of the basic 
principles of the criminal justice system is that of the principle of individual autonomy. 
According to Ashworth, this principle states" ... that each individual should be treated as 
responsible for his or her own behaviour" (Ashworth, 2006, p.25). This principle can be 
best attributed to Caesar Beccaria (1880) who argued that" ... criminals have control over 
their behaviour, that they choose to commit crimes, and that they can be deterred by the 
threat of punishment" (cited in Schmalleger & Volk, 2001, p. 113). The implication of 
this principle is that people are assumed to be free agents who are capable of making 
choices with respect to their behaviour and that they should be held accountable for those 
choices.29 The accountability of an actor for her choices is part of respect for her as a 
choice-making agent. Failing to have respect for this quality denies the moral agency of 
individuals and thereby renders the ethical realm meaningless (Ashworth, 200~ p. 26). 
Thi~Qarticular Qrinciple emQhasizes the importance of individual liberty, but the 
~ ~ ---
criminal law is also cognizant of the fact that individuals do not exist as independent 
agents outside of the social realm, and so the principle of welfare also informs the 
criminal justice system. The welfare principle "gives weight to collective goals," a 
utilitarian principle, and seeks to provide general protections to the community 
(Ashworth, 2006, p. 28). The principle of welfare allows the criminal law to outline what 
28 The term competence is used in the United States to denote an ability to understand the trial and its 
proceedings, that it has consequences and to participate in one's own defence. 
29 It is this characteristic that gives this theory its name rational choice theory. 
acceptable behaviours are in the community - providing the ~'official" goals of the 
collective while the principle of individual autonomy recognizes that community 
members choose how they will behave in their social contexts. The criminal law and 
governing authorities find themselves attempting to strike a balance between these 
competing principles. In Swain (SCC), Justice Lamer points out: 
Parliament's sensitivity to individual rights also expands its 
competence to legislate with respect to procedure for review 
of Lieutenant Governor warrants.30 Although the protection 
of society rationale may not fully authorize such provisions, 
Parliament surely may balance individual rights against the 
interests of protecting society and provide for some system 
of review (R v. Swain, 1991, p. 42 at #118). 
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Therefore if the community is assumed to be a democratic one, the criminal laws within it 
will reflect the common goals of the community members. These principles seem to 
reiterate the idea of the social contract - individuals give up certain liberties to be 
protected by the collective (Locke, 1995)31. Participating in a community in this way, 
however, does not fundamentally change the way individuals are conceived as rational, 
responsible and culpable actors. 
Given the classical idea that humans are motivated by the pleasure principle and 
self interese2, the criminal law can be thought of as outlining general behaviours that 
community members abhor in the main. The scope of the criminal law reaches far beyond 
sanctioning those behaviours that jeopardize the basic needs for the well being of citizens 
30 LG Warrants were applied to accused offenders who were found to be unfit for trial and automatically 
remanded into custody and also to iliose found not guilty by reason of mental disorder. This system no 
longer exists and has been replaced by Review Boards iliat are legislated to periodically review ilie cases of 
persons who are unfit for trial and who are held in psychiatric custody as well as offenders sentenced to 
psychiatric custody after being found not guilty by reason of mental disorder. 
31 The idea of a social contract is important to social/political philosophy and is elaborated upon most 
famously in contemporary times by John Rawls in his work A Theory of Justice. (1971) 
32 As human nature was conceived by Jeremy Beniliam (2000) - discussed below. 
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in a community (i.e. life, liberty, etc.). Property protection and a myriad of behaviours 
that may have no "victims" are also regulated by the criminal law. This scope is a way of 
conveying to community members their responsibility to one another in order to make 
social life productive and enjoyable. This liberal perspective comes from a long historical 
tradition starting with Socrates, who in the Crito, argued that a person who resides in a 
community and who does not agree with its laws has an obligation to either persuade the 
laws to change orto move out of the state to some place with laws that are more 
agreeable to him. Remaining in the state (community) is an implied acceptance of the 
laws that govern the citizens' behaviours and violating this agreement puts the state at 
risk (plato, 2002). The idea of the social contract model of citizenship and responsibility 
carries through the Enlightenment to contemporary times in the work of John Rawls.33 
Responsibility: 
As a fundamental principle, the principle of autonomy provides an avenue by 
which individuals can be held responsible for their choices. Responsibility is a key 
" 
concept that underlies the criminal law. The concept of responsibility acknowledges the 
communal nature of human beings. C. B. Farrar, in his speech to the 59th Annual 
Congress of the American Prison Association said that "Responsibility then is an attitude 
of man as a social agent and concerns his relations to other social beings" (Farrar, 1930, 
p. 439). The relationship an individual has with others in his community as a responsible 
agent is guided in two ways: morally and legally. The moral and legal realms are 
sometimes thought of as synonymous, especially as the law tends to view itself as the 
33 The post -modern critique of this idea of state formation and the power struggles embedded in this 
conception is beyond the scope of this discussion. See for instance Nancy Fraser (1995) and Iris Young 
(1990) for a discussion on the failure of this type of community to recognize diversity and to properly 
distribute goods. 
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protector of communally shared morals, but it must be remembered that these spheres are 
not necessarily connected in this way. While concepts of what is right and wrong 
sometimes expand and contract with time because they are not absolutes, it is common 
practice that "individual[s] shall be able to discriminate between right and wrong ... " 
(Farrar, 1930, p. 440). The assumption of this ability by the law leaves little room for a 
diverse moral realm and reflects the historical assumption of ethics that there is a 
universal set of rules that applies to all individuals equally. Despite this assumption, 
freedom of choice and of will is one of the fundamental assumptions about human nature, 
especially for the principle of autonomy. 
Humans are conceived of as free agents who are capable of making choices that 
result in actions and consequences. Enlightenment philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, 
who carry on the ancient tradition of universalized morals also ascribe to this idea of the 
freely choosing agent.34 One of the justifications of punishment is that it will deter would-
be criminals from proscribed actions by making the consequences of getting caught much 
more severe than the gains of the action (rational choice theory35). This argument, as put 
forth by Jeremy Bentham, is known as the "hedonistic calculus" or utilitarianism 
(Bentham, 1789). Bentham thought that humans are ruled by pleasure and pain, so the 
risk of pain must be greater than the pleasure one gains from engaging in proscribed 
behaviour. Thus, punishment should work as a deterrent by tipping the scales in favour of 
pain for those people considering illegal means for pleasure. Bentham wrote: "[t]he evils 
34 Kant thought that as rational actors, people are equal and if they are acting in accordance of the 
Categorical Imperative, they are not only treating one another as ends and not means to an end, but they are 
also choosing, by their actions, universalizable imperatives. Thus, actions are chosen freely, but only those 
of them which are performed out of a respect for duty are moral (Kant, 1988). 
35 Rational Choice theory suggests that human beings weigh the options for action before them and choose 
the one that best suits their interests and needs using reason to calculate the potential outcomes. 
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of punishment must ... be made to exceed the advantage of the offence" (quoted in 
Schmalleger & Yolk, 2001, p. 115). Here, the actor is also being ascribed a rational 
nature and it is understood that choices will be made based on the weight of probability. 
The choices of this actor, regardless of whether they are right or wrong, carry 
consequences and it is thought that the actor is responsible for those consequences 
whatever they might be. 
The above discussion about behaviour, human nature, and responsibility provides 
a general framework that underscores the importance of our social context and how the 
multitude of ethical values can come together in general. Understanding the way the 
particular and the universal are related, via the shared human condition, can account for 
the cohesion of the criminal law. A useful theoretical perspective for this discussion of 
responsibility is one of existentialism as outlined by both David Harvey (1993) and Jean 
Paul Sartre (1975). This perspective also weaves together the principles of autonomy and 
welfare by demonstrating how individuals and communities are related. David Harvey, 
" '" 
using ideas reminiscent of Jean Paul Sartre (1975), argues that we create, in fact, the 
universal through particular actions. He writes, "There are only particular, competing, 
fragmented, heterogeneous conceptions of and discourses about justice, which arise out 
of the particular situations of those involved" (Harvey, 1993, p. 50). Moreover, 
the double meaning of universality then becomes plain: 
'universality in the sense of the participation and inclusion 
of everyone in the moral and social life does not imply 
universality in the sense of adoption of a general point of 
view that leaves behind particular affiliations, feelings, 
commitments, and desires.' Universality is no longer rejected 
out of hand , but reinserted in a dialectical relation to particularity, 
positionality, and group difference (Harvey, 1993, p. 57). 
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This dialectical relationship between the universal and the p~cular recalls the image of 
the human and his decision-making capacity as Sartre envisions. 
In his work, "Existentialism Is A Humanism" (1975), Sartre is careful to articulate 
the human subject as one that is situated, instantiated and framed by "facticity.,,36 That 
is, the human being finds itself already being in the world - having a historicity: a place 
in time, and society, and is bound by these conditioning restraints. The freedom of the 
human being lies at its core - specifically because there is no core to be found. That is, 
there is no particular essence of a human being despite the biological conditions that 
identify the human being as such. Sartre defines essence as " ... the sum of the formulae 
and the qualities which make its production and its definition possible ... " (Sartre, 1975, 
p. 348). In other words, the essence of something is what its purpose is and Sartre argues 
that human beings do not have a specific purpose for which they are innately designed. 
The struggle of the individual is grappling with the fundamental, radical freedom that he 
fmds at the core of his being. In addition to the facticity of the human being, the human 
being is also transcendence37. This transcendence is recognition of the fact that ~e are 
already instantiated in a concrete situation, but that nothing dictates to us how we must 
act, be, or think in a given situation. So, how does this translate to the universal and the 
particular? 
According to Sartre (1975), we make of ourselves what we will when we act. Our 
actions ultimately translate to the values we hold - they are value creations and they 
make up part of who we are. Because the human being is aware of propelling itself 
36 Facticity is the collection of facts of a person. For example, gender, age, history, and so on. 
37 Sartre specifically tells us that humans are transcendence, not transcendent because we are always in 
process, not static or stationary. 
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towards a future, and its "thrown-ness," Same thinks that th~ human being is responsible 
for who he is. Not only this, but the human is responsible for all other humans when 
making choices because those choices are made in the belief that the image they create is 
the image that all humankind should have. In other words, when a person chooses a 
specific action in a situation, he is fashioning an image that humankind ought to have. As 
Sartre writes, "I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a 
certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself, I fashion man" 
(Sartre, 1975, p. 350). This project of meaning making has a great deal of responsibility 
attached to it if our choices are to reflect the way we think humanity ought to be. While 
Sartre does not say that there is a human nature, he is careful to suggest that humans 
share similar conditions and that the recognition of these conditions will ultimately lead 
us to be ethical to the Other. 
Harvey (1993) makes similar suggestions about the idea of the situated human 
being. He tells us that all knowledge is situated and in its "vulgar" format, the idea of 
~t 
situatedness "dwells almost entirely on the relevance of individual biographies:"'I see, 
interpret, represent, and understand the work in the way I do because of the particularities 
of my life history" (Harvey, 1993, p.57). Consequently, I would argue that we act in 
particular ways. Harvey is careful to point out that while we might be individuated by 
these processes and actions, we still share the same conditions of being in the world. He 
writes, "Individuals are heterogeneously constructed subjects, internalizing 'otherness' by 
virtue of their relations to the world" (Harvey, 1993, p. 58). Moreover, if we are social 
constructs, we are shaped and changed by the dynamics of the fluidity of the social, and 
in tum, we shape and change the social through our meaning-making activities and value 
creations. Thus, the dialectical relationship of the universal and the particular becomes 
evident. Harvey tells us that "[ d]ialectics ... teaches that universality always exists in 
relation to particularity: neither can be separated from the other even though they are 
distinctive moments within our conceptual operations and practical engagements" 
(Harvey, 2000, p. 241). 
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Adopting the existentialist position is an endorsement of the principle of 
autonomy, but the recognition of ourselves as social creatures that are able to respond to 
the call of Others, speaks to the principle of welfare as well. Thus individuals are free 
. willing and choosing creatures whose choices reflect their values and speak to the 
community about the values it should endorse. The emphasis on responsibility in this 
philosophical position demonstrates the need for accountability that can be had in a 
morally pluralistic world. Thus the issue of responsibility is dealt with on several levels. 
Treating issues of moral importance can become daunting if we accept relativism, but the 
fluid nature of the ethical realm and the legal one (if one accepts the idea that at least 
some important ethical values are embedded in the law), provides us with the If.. 
opportunities to be responsible. A significant contribution to the idea of responsibility 
with respect to the criminal justice system can be found in the writings ofH. L. A. Hart. 
Hart (2008) considered the concept of responsibility in depth. He suggested that 
this concept is very broad and that it can be broken down into four general types. The 
first type is that of role responsibility, where a person's responsibilities are directly 
related to the roles she plays in her life. Thus a person whose role is that of an educator, 
for instance, takes on and accepts responsibility for conducting herself in a specific 
manner, providing accurate information, and maintaining certain classroom decorum. The 
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second type of responsibility is that of causal responsibility and can incorporate both 
people, their actions, omissions, and things, conditions and events that result in outcomes. 
Liability-Responsibility is the third type outlined by Hart and it directly relates to the law 
and its ability to hold people accountable for their actions and to punish them as 
necessary provided they meet the legal criteria that makes them accountable. Capacity 
responsibility is the final type in Hart's account and it hinges on the capacities of a person 
that includes understanding, reasoning and control of conduct (as cited in Gross, 1991, 
pp. 492 - 500). These types of responsibility are not exclusive from one another; rather 
they are intimately intertwined with one another. However capacity-responsibility will be 
the focus of the current study as the capacities for understanding, reasoning and conduct 
control are assumed to be generally present in "normal" adults and it is this assumption 
that requires investigation. Capacity responsibility seems directly related to the concept 
of rationality as outlined above but before these links can be demonstrated by legal 
examples, the concept of culpability needs to be addressed. 
Culpability: 
The culpability or blameworthiness of a person is directly linked to that person's 
rational faculty and his responsibility. Given the assumptions (noted above) that people 
are generally free, capable, choice makers, holding them culpable for their action is the 
next logical step. The recognition of autonomy and the ability to choose leads to an 
insistence that persons accept responsibility for their actions and also that they will be 
culpable for them in the eyes of the community. A person is held culpable for actions that 
require blame, whether moral or legal. It is not necessruy for a person to be legally 
culpable for her actions in order to assign blame to her for their consequences, but legal 
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culpability often reflects moral culpability. This reflection o~curs because, in many 
instances, the law outlines proscribed activities that would normally be thought of as 
morally problematic. (It is important to note that not all legal proscriptions carry a moral 
weight and not all immoral actions cross legal boundaries). Criminal law is a "last resort" 
for behaviour control and it is wise to remember that there are other avenues by which 
unacceptable behaviour is controlled.38 Actions for which someone is not legally culpable 
can still be morally culpable and others may pursue avenues by which to make someone 
pay for his actions. For example, O.J. Simpson was not culpable for the murders of 
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman in the criminal courts, but he is still blamed for 
their deaths and was found culpable in civil court. Distinguishing between culpability and 
responsibility is difficult as these two terms seem to be used synonymously. 
Rationality: 
The concept of rationality has been an important one in the development of 
Modem Western civilization. Rationality has been considered the characteristic that 
" 
",. 
distinguishes humankind from other animals in a fundamental way (cited in Aristotle, 
1999, p. 9.). In this context, rationality implies an ability to make choices on the basis of 
the logical weight of potential outcomes, rather than by mere instinctual or animalistic 
drives. Thinking of rationality in this way has significant implications in both a moral and 
a legal context. 
Rational thought has been conceived ofin a specific way. The rational actor can 
demonstrate an ability to appreciate the nature, context and consequences of his actions in 
38 For instance, infmmal social mechanisms like family, school, peers, etc. 
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any given situation. Moreover, the rational actor is thought tq have sufficient ability to be 
"response-able" in his existential situations and is able to appreciate (and choose) moral 
behaviours. Rationality is connected to logic. A person is considered rational if she can 
provide a plausible argument for undertaking a certain course of action. Being able to 
formulate this argument requires an awareness of time, space, and place to varying 
degrees and the ability to relate relevant factual information in a sequence that leads to 
the conclusion in a logical way. 
Logical thinking entails a process of being able to assess situations and think 
through the potential outcomes of any course of action before choosing one to execute. It 
involves a process of constructing arguments that justify actions based on an ability to 
predict or foresee the consequences of those actions. Of course no one can know the full 
scope of the consequences of an action for certain, but it is expected that the individual 
will be able to at least perceive some of the ends his actions will bring about. For 
instance, a person who is faced with the opportunity to hit someone else should be able to 
foresee that his action will potentially: 1) cause pain 2) incite anger 3) instigate 6a fight 4) 
get hit back and so on. It might not be foreseen that hitting someone will cause that 
person to die, but the logical process for either hitting someone else or not is assumed to 
be a part of the rational actor's abilities.39 
The Law of Criminal Responsibility in Canada: 
The previous outline of the discourses of autonomy, rationality, culpability, and 
reasonableness serve to provide an outline of the kinds of qualities or characteristics that 
39 I return to this idea with the discussion of appreciation below. 
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are called to mind when these concepts are invoked. These c~ncepts play an important 
role in the way the law conceives of the punishable subject and so their exploration 
provides a foundation on which to take a look at the technical workings of the law. A 
criminal act is conceived of as having two important components: actus reus and mens 
rea. The former component is the action itself, while the latter is the mental component 
often referred to as the "guilty mind." 
The mental component of what is criminal is the focus of this study and the 
recognition of specific mental capacities has been important to the idea of criminal 
justice. Hence, an accused person facing a criminal hearing is presumed to have certain 
mental capacities, as well as innocence. The mental capacities assumed by the criminal 
justice system are those of understanding, reasoning, and conduct control. An accused 
offender who lacks these capacities or whose capacities are severely compromised, is one 
who is either deemed unfit for trial, or who is able to legitimately plead "not guilty by 
reason of mental disorder." 
Historically, a person incapable of rational thought has been labelled mentally 
disordered. This orientation has become an important factor in determining an accused 
person's ability to participate in a trial to determine his guilt. Fitness and insanity were 
not considered distinct from one another at the time of Daniel M'Naghten in the mid 
1800's.40 The M'Naghten Rule in Canada has been an important guideline established for 
dealing with accused offenders claiming to not be responsible for their actions or to have 
diminished responsibility. The M'Naghten Rule came about as the result of the trial of 
40 Trial Fi1ness is about a person's mental state at the time of the trial, while Insanity as a defence is about 
the person's mental state at the time of the crime. This distinction was not made until the mid 1900' s. 
37 
Daniel M'Naghten who in 1844 shot and killed Edward Drummond, mistaking him for 
Sir Robert Peel. M'Naghten's lawyers argued that although he intended to kill Peel, he 
was suffering from delusions of prosecution at the time of the shooting and was, in effect, 
labouring under a defect of reason. The House of Lords accepted this defence and 
established what is now known as the M'Naghten Rule. The principle 
... holds that individuals cannot be held criminally 
responsible for their actions if at the time of the offence 
either (1) they did not know what they were doing, or 
(2) they did not know that what they were doing was 
wrong (Schmalleger & Yolk, 2001, p. 188). 
In other words, an accused person must know the nature and the quality of his act in order 
to be held criminally liable for it. This rule has had an important influence on Canadian 
criminal law. 
Another case that did not make the distinction between fitness and insanity or 
used the terms competency and insanity interchangeably occurred in the United States. In 
Youtsey v. The United States (1899), the accused was thought to have committed fraud. 
His defence to this charge was that he suffered from an epileptic fit and his lawyer argued 
that the duress of a trial could bring about another attack and that for this and various 
other reasons, his trial should be given a continuance. It was not. In the appeal to this 
case, the appellate court found in favour of the defendant stating that it is "a violation of 
due process to try an incompetent defendanf' (Fredrick, DeMeir, & Towers, 2004, p. 5) . 
The trial judges concluded that, "it is fundamental that an insane person can neither plead 
to an arraignment, be subjected to a trial or, after trial, receive judgment, or, after 
judgment, undergo punishment" (Fredrick, DeMeir, & Towers, 2004, p. 6). 
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While these two cases do not specifically make the distinction between fitness (or 
competence) and insanity, it is clear that these issues are distinct and separate. The 
M'Naghten rule seems to apply more directly to the mental state of the defendant while 
committing the act, while the Youtsey appeal takes into account the accused offender's 
mental state at the time of the trial as well as at the time of the act. The distinction 
between fitness and insanity becomes more evident as guidelines for criminal justice are 
revised over time taking into account developments in psychiatry and the problems that 
corne with such statements from jurists. 
Fitness in the Law: 
The process of being determined fit for trial generally occurs before an accused is 
brought to court to face or answer to the charges being brought against him (i.e. a 
preliminruy hearing). In Canada, either the Crown prosecutor or the defence may ask for 
a fitness hearing to determine if the accused person is oriented to time and place, is able 
to understand the charges he is facing, the consequences ofbeing found guilty of them, 
" " 
and is able to assist his attorney in creating a defence to the charges his is facing. 
Moreover, fitness can be an issue from the time the accused is arraigned to the time a 
verdict is reached. Bill C-I0, which carne into effect in 1992 in Canada, states: 
"unfit to stand trial" is defined in s.2 [of the Canadian Criminal 
Code] as meaning "unable on account of mental disorder to conduct 
a defence at any stage of the proceedings before a verdict is rendered, 
or to instruct counsel to do so (Bill C-IO, p.9). 
In Canada, the concept of fitness as outlined in Section 2 of the Criminal Code, 
states that "an accused may be unfit ifunable to: 1) understand the nature or object of the 
proceedings, 2) understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or 3) 
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communicate with counsel" (Davis, 1994, pp. 324-5). Bill C:-10 outlined what is meant 
by the "limited cognitive capacity test" in response to recommendations that a more 
sophisticated test be implemented. According to Bill C-I0, the "limited cognitive 
capacity test" is: 
. .. an accused is considered to be fit to stand trial when he or 
she has the capacity to understand the process and instruct 
counsel, but the accused is not required to be capable of 
exercising analytical reasoning in making a choice to accept 
the advice of counselor in coming to a decision that best 
serves his or her interests (Bill C-I0, p. 10). 
Therefore, the accused need not be able to make a choice or decision in his own best 
interests when instructing counsel. A person who does not meet these criteria, as assessed 
by a psychiatrist, may be deemed unfit for trial in which case she could be remanded into 
psychiatric custody until such time as fitness is restored. The criteria outlined in Section 2 
of the Canadian Criminal Code should be understood as the construction of fitness. 
Roesch and Goulding argue that "fitness must be seen as a constrnct and that 'the 
meaning of a construct can never be fully reduced to a set of concrete operations and 
" o 
observational terms' ... fitness is a relative term, and what constitutes fitness in one case 
may not be the same in a different case" (cited in Davis, 1994, p. 328). 
Canada is not the only countIY that has provisions for fitness. In the United States, 
the criteria for competency can be found in the Dusky ruling. In Dusky v. The United 
States (1960) Dusky was found to be oriented to time, place, and person as well as 
seemingly capable of assisting counsel with his defence at his initial trial and as a result, 
was declared competent to stand trial. Thus, the criterion for competency has to do with 
one's present abilities: 
The test must be whether the defendant has sqfficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him 
(Fredrick, DeMeir, & Towers, 2004, p. 14). 
Here the idea of a rational being is firmly assumed as a necessary condition for the 
accused to be considered competent to stand trial. This component is hinted at in the 
Canadian construct of fitness, but it is not clear that rationality or reasonableness is the 
driving assumed condition. It has been argued that the standards of the Dusky ruling in 
the United States "must be taken to mean no more than that the defendant is able to 
confer coherently with counsel and have some appreciation of the significance of the 
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proceedings and his involvement in it" (Unknown Author, Incompetency To Stand Trial, 
1967, p. 457). This interpretation of the Dusky ruling is designed to prevent the person of 
low intelligence from being declared incompetent.41 However like the Canadian "limited 
cognitive capacity" test an accused need not be able to be rational enough to make a 
decision in his own best interests. 
Roesch et al. (1999) provide a summary of the general rationale for takihg into 
consideration the fitness of an accused person: "an accused individual must be protected 
from a conviction that could have resulted from a lack ofparticipation or capacity to 
make proper judgment" (Schuller, Ogloff, & James, 2001, p. 293). This rationale stems 
from the idea that a person cannot be tried in absentia; she must be present to answer to 
the charges against her and be able to confront her accusers. General guidelines for the 
criteria of fitness have been provided by English Common Law: 
41 Elaboration of the interpretation of the American case is useful as an indicator of the influence of the 
concepts of rationality and reasonableness in law. Canada's construction of the idea of fitness is less fmn 
with respect to these concepts and yet, their influence and importance will be demonstrated below. 
The common law test of incompetency, unde:r: which the focus 
is upon the defendant's capacity to understand the nature and 
object of the proceedings against him and to make a rational 
defence. [ ... ] Beyond the ability to recall and relate factual 
information, the common law test requires that the defendant be 
able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation 
to it (No Author, Incompetency To Stand Trial, 1967, p. 459). 
These guidelines have been developed out of the case of Pritchard (1836) where the 
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judge suggested three criteria that needed to be answered: 1) can the accused assist in his 
own defence? 2) does the accused understand his role in the proceedings? 3) does the 
accused understand the nature and object of the proceedings? (Schuller,.ogloff, & 
James, 2001, p. 294).42 If the defendant cannot satisfactorily demonstrate that he meets 
these criteria, Canadian criminal law will declare him unfit for trial as per Section 2 of the 
Criminal Code. 
Insanity43 and the Law 
In Canada, the Criminal Code deals with insanity in Section 16 which reads: 
1) No person is criminally responsible fOTan act committed 
or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder 
that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature 
and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong. 
2) Every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental disorder so as 
to be exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of subsection (1), 
until the contrary is proved on the balance of probabilities. 
42 See also Ashworth, A. (2006), p. 204 
43 Although this tennmology is dated, as Canada now uses the term Not Guilty By Reason of Mental 
Disorder, or Not Criminally Responsibk (NCR), it is commonly used in literature (e.g. Finkle 1988, 
Verdun-Jones, 1994). Moreover, I am not convinced by McLauchlin (1995) that this change in tennmology 
/ semantics overcomes the binary of sane/insane in terms of providing a treatment option to those not 
criminally responsible in the eyes of the law. The critique of binaries in this thesis does not demand a 
change in terminology, but does seek to question the meanings attributed to such terms, for as Arrigo 
(2003) notes, the deconstruction of binaries is temporary and incomplete. 
3) The burden of proof that an accused was suffering from a mental 
disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility is on the 
party that raises the issue. 
It must be noted here that the insanity defence44 differs from the fitness test. A 
person can suffer from a mental disorder and still be fit for trial and it is not necessary 
that an unfit person has a mental disorder that qualifies him for a defence of NCR. 
Moreover, the determination offitness to stand trial is an evaluation ofan accused 
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person's current mental state, while the person who attempts to raise the insanity defence 
must convincingly demonstrate that he suffered from the mental disorder at the time his 
crime was committed. 
The defence of insanity, as it was called in Canada lIDtil1992, deals with an 
accused person's state of mind at the time he committed the proscribed act. The concept 
of a mental disease has not been a clear one. In Cooper v. The Queen (1979), Justice 
Dickson defined "disease of the mind" as: 
any illness, disorder, or abnormal condition which impairs 
the human mind and its functioning, excluding however, 
selfinduced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as 
transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion 
(Roach, 2004, p. 256). 
The term "disease of the mind" is a legal one and jurists determine what type of mental 
conditions fall under its scope. In Cooper v. The Queen, Justice Dickson quoting Justice 
Martin, wrote: 
The term" disease of the mind" is a legal concept although 
it includes a medical component, and what is meant by that 
term is a question of law for the Judge .... It is the function 
of the psychiatrist to describe the accused's mental condition 
44 This defence is now known as the defence of Not Criminally Responsible by Reason of Mental Disorder 
(NCR). 
and how it is considered from the medical po~t of view. It is 
for the Judge to decide whether the condition described is 
comprehended by the term "disease of the mind" 
(as cited in Roach 2004, p. 259). 
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Justice Dickson noted that the ability to appreciate the nature and quality of an act as per 
Section 16(1) of the Criminal Code should be interpreted as an ability to perceive. Justice 
Dickson stated: 
The requirement, unique to Canada, is that of perception, 
an ability to perceive the consequences, impact, and results 
of a physical act. An accused may be aware of the physical 
character of his action (i.e. choking) without necessarily 
having the capacity to appreciate that, in nature and quality, 
the act will result in the death of a human being (Cooper v. 
The Queen 1979, p. 15). 
In other words, Justice Dickson makes it clear that there is a difference between having 
mere cognition of a physical act and understanding what its consequences are and that 
this wording is significantly different from that of English Common Law where the word 
"know" is employed. Moreover, the McRuer Report (1956), as referred to by Justice 
Dickson, states: 
Under the Canadian statute law, a disease of the mind that 
renders the accused person incapable of an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the act must necessarily involve more 
than the mere knowledge that the act is being committed; 
there must be an appreciation of the factors involved and a 
mental capacity to measure and foresee the consequences 
of the violent act (Cooper v. The Queen 1979, p. 17). 
In 1991, the case of Owen Swain brought about sweeping changes to the common 
law rule in Canada. Swain, who successfully pled not guilty by reason of insanity, 
challenged the constitutionality of the ability of the Crown to raise this defence and also 
the practice of indefinite incarceration in a mental institution. The result of this appeal, 
and the judge's finding that it is problematic for the Crown to raise the issue of mental 
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disorder when the accused has no desire to raise it was a ch8Q.ge in the common law. 
Chief Justice Lamer, pointed out in his commentary that one of the fundamental 
principles that guides an adversarial system of justice is that a (fit) accused has the right 
to raise his own defence and that allowing the Crown to interj ect the possibility of a 
different defence can have devastating and detrimental effects for the accused. As noted 
by Justice Wilson: 
The common law rule permitting the Crown to raise the 
issue of insanity over the accused's objections countenances 
too great an interference with an accused's fundamental right 
to advance whatever defence he or she considers appropriate. 
The Crown's ability to raise insanity may substantially reduce 
the chances of an accused's outright acquittal by defeating the 
strategy chosen, undermining his or her credibility, and tainting 
the trial with the inevitable inference that heor she, because of 
mental illness, is the type of person who would likely have 
committed the offence (R v. Swain 1991, p. 6). 
Thus the common law rule was revised to only allow the Crown to "lead evidence of 
insanity" (R v. Swain 1991) if the accused puts her mental capacities into question but 
does not raise the defence. 
The impact of the Swain case did not stop with the revamping of the common law 
rules. In 1992, Bill C-10 was introduced into legislation that made other important 
changes. The first of these changes was the renaming of the insanity defence to "Not 
Criminally Responsible On Account Of Mental Disorder (NCR)." In her commentary 
about the challenges of mental illness and the law, Justice Beverly McLachlin explains 
the significance of the new wording: 
This change in terminology recognizes that mental illness 
may operate to exempt an accused person from criminal 
responsibility. It also signifies that we are no longer faced 
with a stark choice between acquittal and conviction of 
mentally ill persons. The lawnow offers a third alternative 
under which mentally ill offenders are diverted into a special 
stream where the twin goals of protecting the public and 
treating the ill offender fairly and appropriately are pursued 
(McLauchlin 2005). 
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Not only did Canada do away with insanity as terminology, but as mentioned earlier, the 
practice of indeterminate custody under the Lieutenant Governor Warrants (L WG) 
system was also abolished. In place ofLGW, a practical review board system was 
instituted, whose powers, which include ordering assessments and reviewing the status of 
accused persons and NCR detainees, are outlined in Bill C-I0. Those persons found NCR 
and who are institutiop.alized now have their status reviewed annually by the Provincial 
Review Board where previously, status reviews were at the "pleasure of the lieutenant 
governor" and often did not take place at all (Verdun-Jones, 1981, p. 365). Moreover, 
prior to the introduction of Bill C-I0, those persons declared unfit and remanded into 
psychiatric custody often spent more time in custody than they would have if they had 
been merely convicted of their crimes and sent to prison (Verdun-Jones 1981, p. 365). 
The Criminal Code is not the only piece oflegislation that applies to mentally 
disordered accused persons. Those persons whose fitness is in question or whose sanity is 
in question are also affected by provincial mental health laws. In Ontario, this law is the 
Ontario Mental Health Act and it governs the operation of the psychiatric system, how 
mentally disordered persons can enter and exit it, the role of the psychiatrist and/or 
psychologist in assessing patients and making orders for custodial purposes, and the 
rights of those people entering the psychiatric system. 
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Section 16 of the Ontario Mental Health Acl5 provides guidelines as to when a 
Justice of the Peace can make an order for a psychiatric assessment. In brief, the reasons 
for such an order can be made if information under oath is brought before the Justice that 
demonstrates the accused has threatened to harm himself or others, has attempted to 
cause bodily harm to another, or made another fearful of being caused bodily harm, or 
shows alack of competence for his own care (RS.O. 1990 ChapterM7, 2004). 
Moreover, the Justice of the Peace must have reasonable grounds to believe the accused 
is suffering from a mental disorder whose nature and quality demonstrates likelihood that 
the accused will present these dangers. A Justice of the Peace may also issue an order if 
the person brought before him has previously suffered from a treatable mental disorder 
for which she has previously received treatment and the failure to get treatment for this 
disorder will likely result in personal harm or harm to others (R.S.O. 1990 Chapter M7, 
2004). This Act also outlines the powers of the police officer who comes across a person 
whom he believes to be suffering from a mental disorder. The police officer who has 
"reasonable and probable" grounds to believe that a person has been behaving disprderly 
and has either threatened or attempted to cause himself or another bodily harm, or is 
behaving or was behaving violently towards another, or who demonstrates a lack of 
competence in caring for himself and whom the officer is "of the opinion" that the person 
suffers from a mental disorder whose nature and quality will "likely result in" serious 
bodily harm to himself or another, or "serious physical impairment" of the person can 
take that person into custody and deliver him to an "appropriate place for examination by 
a physician" (R.S.O. 1990 Chapter M7, 2004). 
45 See Appendix B for relevant sections of the Ontario Mental Health Act 
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Summing up from the Ontario Mental Health Act and the Canadian Centre for 
Addiction and Mental Health, the steps involved in the process for assessing a person 
who is thought to have a mental disorder are as follows: 1) a police officer encounters a 
person who has threatened himself or someone else with physical bodily harm or who has 
caused violence to another person or who seems to be unable to competently care for 
himself If the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that this individual 
is suffering from a mental disorder to such a degree that he presents a significant threat to 
himself or another, the officer may take that person into custody placing him in an 
"appropriate" facility for a mental assessment. A doctor who makes the assessment may 
fill out a specific form to involuntarily keep the person in the institution for up to 72 
hours if the doctor thinks that this person presents a significant threat to himself or 
someone else or ifhe is incapable of competently caring for himself After 72 hours, if 
the patient remains, in the opinion of the doctor, unstable his stay can be extended if the 
doctor fills out the necessary forms. If the patient does not meet the requirements for an 
involuntary commitment on his initial presentation by the officer, the officer m{wrelease 
him, or charge him and place him in j ail. Regardless of the place of custody, the accused 
is entitled to the counsel of a lawyer. If the person remains in the custody of the forensic 
psychiatric system, he is examined by a forensic psychiatrist or other designated person 
as to his mental condition for fitness to stand trial and/or his mental condition at the time 
of his alleged offence. Similarly, if the accused makes it to court for a preliminary 
hearing and his fitness is questioned, he is remanded into the psychiatric system for 
assessment. If the accused is found fit to stand trial, he proceeds to court. In order to be 
found fit, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health's (CAMH) information guide says: 
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To decide that you are fit to stand trial, the judge mus~ believe that you are able to 
do the following: 
• You must be able to describe the roles of the people 
in a courtroom, such as the Crown counsel 
the defence counsel (your lawyer) and the judge. 
• You must have a general understanding of what happens 
in court. For instance you must understand what 
the possible verdicts (or outcomes) are and what 
and oath is. 
• You must be able to instruct your lawyer and take 
part in your own defence. (Barbaree, 2004, p. 17) 
Ifhe is found unfit, he is remanded into the psychiatric system for a period not exceeding 
60 days for a Treatment Order to make him fit (i.e. with medication). If it is doubtful that 
he will ever be fit, the accused can be placed under the authority of the Ontario Review 
Board and remains in the psychiatric system where his status is reviewed annually. In this 
instance, the Crown must continue to prove there is a prima facie case against the 
accused evety year and ifit cannot, the accused is acquitted (but this does not necessarily 
mean that he is released from the psychiatric system).46 
While all these processes seem to be straightforward and are written in such a way 
as to be clearly outlined, the practical application of these policies and how they are 
implemented needs to be questioned. For example, while it is the judge who determines 
broad concepts that require interpretation of what mental conditions fall under the notion 
of "mental disease," the courts do rely on medical testimony about persons before the 
court. It is not clear how much reliance and weight is given to the testimony of people 
46 In R v. Demers (2004), the Supreme Court of Canada held that when an accused is determined to be 
permanently unfit he should be granted a stay of proceedings within 30 days of this determination. Since 
fitness and dangerousness are two different issues, an unfit accused can be assessed for dangerousness 
within this thirty days to allow for a proper application for detention under provincial mental health laws 
since the criminal law will no longer have powers with respect to the accused's detention. See R v. Demers, 
page 41 section 106. 
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who are involved in the forensic psychiatric process. Grisso (2003) points out: "that 
judges are free to accept or reject the clinician's opinion, after clinicians have explained 
the logic and reasons for arriving at the decision" (Grisso, 2003, p. 82). 
Psychiatry and the Social Construction of the Unfit: 
The role of tIle forensic psychiatrist is complex, and at times, ambiguous. The 
discipline of psychiatry claims to follow rigorous scientific methods and principles of 
modernity. Certain conditions must be met in order for a discipline to be called a 
'science'. First, consistent, reliable data agreed upon by members of the discipline must 
make up its body of knowledge. There must also be agreement as to the methodology for 
the collection of data that can be replicated by other members in order to be considered 
worthy of addition to the core body of knowledge. Third, this knowledge must be 
cumulative, and integrated into the core body of knowledge. Finally, "the discipline must 
be predictive ... and therefore falsifiable" (Coles and Veie12001, p. 609). In other words, 
a science must be able to produce a body of knowledge using data collection methods that 
make the approach to a problem repeatable and with reliable, consistent results. 
~ 
'" 
Psychiatry (and psychology47) tends to present its findings in quantifiable formats (i.e. 
statistics, charts, etc.) and this presentation tends to give the impression that this data is a 
fair and accurate representation of the reality of the issues being investigated.48 In order 
47 Psychiatry and psychology differ in that psychiatrists are medical physicians and as such have been 
designated to evaluate fitness issues because mental disorder is thought to be an illness (and in the 
Canadian context, "the assumption of medical dominance has persisted"). Psychologists have been gaining 
more ground in their ability to participate in courts and in fitness assessments as their discipline becomes 
more regulated and recognized as valuable and reliable. Viljoen et al, note that psychologists are more 
likely to use "objective tests more frequently than psychiatrists in fitness and criminal responsibility 
evaluations". Forensic training is something that enables the evaluator offitness to better understand the 
legal criteria involved in fitness assessments (Viljoen, Ogloff, & Zapf, 2003). 
48 This authoritative presentation of [mdings gets its power from our faith in mathematics and numbers. 
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to obtain such data, members of the psychiatric discipline devise standardized tests in 
order to meet the requirements of what it means to be a science. 
In its pursuit to be called a science, psychiatry reduces the human element to 
sliding scales, controlled environments, and provides generalizations about how human 
behaviours can be understood. For example, psychiatric profiling is one tool employed 
by the criminal justice system that can be seen as an example of how powerful this 
discipline can be in the fight against crime. This tool is utilized by providing a forensic 
psychiatrist the raw data of a set of crimes that are suspected to be related. The 
psychiatrist then identifies behavioural patterns in the evidence and generates a profile of 
the kind of criminal likely to have committed the crimes that police can use to focus their 
efforts (Douglas & Olshaker, 1997). Other uses for forensic psychiatrists in the criminal 
justice system include predicting recidivism, and predicting dangerousness. Forensic 
psychiatrists are also utilized by the criminal justice system to evaluate the mental states 
of accused offenders to determine whether they are able to participate in the judicial 
" process or not, and/or whether their mental states at the time of their crimes are "of a 
nature that allows them to present a defence of not criminally responsible. It is this 
function offorensic psychiatry that will be focused on here. 
The forensic psychiatrist is called upon to make an assessment of the mental states 
of an accused offender when his fitness is in question or when his criminal responsibility 
is questioned. Assessing the fitness of an individual in Canada can occur on an inpatient 
or an outpatient basis. Generally, these assessments are done in a psychiatric facility 
where the accused is detained. In order to make this assessment, the Canadian forensic 
psychiatrist employs the Fitness Interview Test-Revised (FIT -R; Roesch, Zapf, Webster 
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& Eaves, 1999). This test is divided into three sections to help the psychiatrist detennine 
if the accused 1) understands the nature and object of the proceedings, 2) understands the 
possible consequences of the proceedings, and 3) assesses the ability of the individual to 
communicate with counsel (Schuller, Ogloff, & James, 2001, p. 297). This test is 
designed to examine the accused person's current mental state and allows the psychiatrist 
to present his findings to the trier of facts G udge) at an assessment hearing. If the accused 
is deemed unfit by the judge, he can be remanded into custody for treatment to restore 
him to fitness whereupon his trial will proceed. 
A similar process occurs for an accused who wants to plead not criminally 
responsible by reason of mental disorder (s. 16 c.c.c.), except the mental state to be 
investigated is one that occurred at the time of the crime and not before or after. A couple 
of tools have been developed to assist forensic psychiatrists with this more difficult task 
of assessing a person's criminal responsibility. These tools are mostly employed in the 
United States and they are known as the Mental State at the Time of the Offence 
" Screening Evaluation (MSE) and the Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessme:nt'Scales 
(R-CRAS). They were developed to standardize the way assessments are conducted. It 
must be remembered here that while these tools allow a mental health professional to 
make statements about an accused person's mental health, it is ultimately a jurist's 
decision, as a trier of fact, to decide if the accused has a mental disorder in law that would 
affect criminal responsibility. 
The role of forensic psychiatIy and its importance to the criminal justice system 
has not been without its criticism. Coles and Veiel (2001) suggest that equating legal and 
psychological concepts is problematic. They argue that "[w]hen psychologists become 
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expert witnesses, they similarly recast legal concepts in the ~ould of their conceptual 
framework" (Coles & Veiel, 2001, p. 610). It is not the case that the legal and 
psychological concepts are directly equivalent to one another and their conflation can be 
misleading. Moreover the concept of fitness, according to Coles and Veiel, is one that is 
relational but it is often "conceptualized as an absolute, a characteristic of the individual 
rather than a product of the interaction of the individual with his or her legal 
environmenf' (Veiel and Coles 1999, p. 356). Practically, the consideration of fitness as 
an individual's character suggests that there is a fit character and an unfit character. This 
way of conceiving the individual may stem from the idea that the law presumes 
individuals to be fit, just as the law presumes the individual to be innocent until proven 
otherwise. The concept of fitness cannot be reduced to a quantifiable number and to do so 
is to conceive of it in a manner that is inappropriate (Veiel and Coles 1999). 
Chapter 3 is an examination of one of the tools used to examine or evaluate 
accused offenders whose fitness for trial is in question. In this chapter I argue that the 
" FIT -R test is a rigorous tool that attempts to closely mirror the legal concept o{fitness as 
found in Section 2 of the Canadian Criminal Code. In doing so, this tool uses the 
concepts of rationality, reasonableness and culpability to inform its evaluative process 
and these concepts or discourses support one another and work in tandem to construct the 
fit subject. 
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Chapter 3: The Construction of Fitness Through Scientific Evaluation - The FIT-R 
The preceding chapter served to provide a foundation on which to trace the 
discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability by outlining the kinds of 
characteristics associated with them. These combined characteristics serve to construct 
the fit and therefore punishable subject. In this chapter, I explore how these discourses 
function in a test designed to evaluate a person's fitness for trial. I argue that these 
discourses work together and support each other in this construction to provide an 
understanding of the abilities a person is assumed to possess by the law. 
The fit person is thought to be one who acts autonomously when making choices. 
This choice-making ability is what fundamentally distinguishes humans from other 
creatures, according to Sartre (1975), and is the way we inhabit our existential situation. 
The discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability reinforce the idea of the 
autonomous subject by sketching out the important and desirable traits that are thought to 
be possessed by the fit and autonomous subject. The law assumes these characteristics to 
be standard amongst the citizens over whom it rules. When a person's fitness is in 
question, the law often tums to psychiatIy for assistance in determining how to proceed. 
The Fitness futerview Test - Revised is a tool designed to evaluate how a person can 
respond to the law. As a result, the discourses of reasonableness, rationality and 
culpability are present within it and are at work to distinguish the fit from the unfit. 
The Fitness Interview Test - Revised: 
I chose the Fitness Interview Test - Revised because its original development in 
1984 was specific to the Canadian context and its current edition remains primarily 
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focussed on the Canadian legal system, even though the auth9rs express an expanded 
applicability and usage. Moreover, the revised edition (1998) employed here reflects 
significant changes in Canadian law49 and also includes a review of US law and 
procedure as its applicability extends to both countries and Great Britain. The developers 
of the FIT -R claim that the content of the interview itself has not changed significantly 
(Roesch, Zap( & Eaves, 2006, p.xi). 
It is a necessruy condition, but not a sufficient condition that a person whose 
fitness is questioned has a diagnosed mental disorder (Roesch, Zapf & Eaves, 2006, pp. 
9-10). That a person has a mental disorder, however, does not automatically make that 
individual unfit for trial, and therefore the FIT -R is employed to determine whether or not 
the accused can adequately participate in his trial. In other words, the FIT -R is designed 
to measure a person's psycho-legal abilities and the impact of an existing mental disorder 
on them. Its design specifically reflects the three general psycho-legal components found 
under Section 2 of the Canadian Criminal Code per R. v. Taylor: 1) understanding the 
nature or object of the proceedings, 2) understanding the possible consequences of the 
proceedings, and 3) communicating with counsel. 
The criteria outline what it means to be legally fit for trial and the FIT -R test is 
organized into three sections that correspond to these criteria after an initial section of 
four questions designed to obtain background information about the evaluee. Moreover, 
the FIT -R is a semi-structured interview without closed-ended choice answers designed 
to "evaluat[e] a defendant's competence to stand trial" (Roesch, Zap£: & Eaves, 2006, 
49 Especially changes in 1992 as reflected by Bill C-30. 
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p.l 0). It does so by taking into consideration questions that ~ould demonstrate the 
evaluee's understandingiinteIpretation of these three legal criteria. 
The first section is correspondingly labelled, "Understand the Nature or Object of 
Proceedings: Factual Knowledge of Criminal Procedure" and has six subsections with a 
series of corresponding questions. These subsections examine different elements of the 
proceedings. For instance, Subsection 1 is titled "Understand the Arrest Process," and 
includes questions like "What happened when the police carne?" and "Did the police read 
you your (Miranda/arrest) rights?". 
The second section is labelled, "Understand the Possible Consequences of the 
Proceedings: Appreciation of Personal Involvement in and Importance of the 
Proceedings." This section consists of three subsections whose headings are: "Appreciate 
the range and nature of possible penalties," "Appraisal of available legal defenses [sic]," 
and Appraisal oflikely outcome." This section includes questions like: "Will you plead 
guilty or not guilty at your trial? Why?, and "How do you think you can be defended 
~ 
against these charges?". 
The final section, "Communicate With Counsel: Abjlity to Participate in Defense 
[sic]" has seven subsections whose titles include: "Capacity to communicate facts to 
lawyer," "Capacity to plan legal strategy," and "Capacity to manage courtroom behavior 
[sic]." The evaluator is free to probe the respondent further and also to personalize the 
interview in order to "determine the defendant's understanding of the questions and to 
assess his or her cognitive abilities" (Roesch, Zapf & Eaves, 2006, pp. 10-11). The 
responses that are provided to the administrator of this interview are ranked 0 -2 with 
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zero being classified as "no impairment" and two being classified as "definite/serious 
impairment." A score of one as "possible or mild impairmenf' is ambiguous and persons 
scoring one or two are "referred for a more detailed investigation of their competence" 
(Roesch, Zapf & Eaves, 2006, p. 25). 
Each question in each section is ranked in this manner with the exception of the 
first four questions which seek only to get a sense of the evaluee's background. The 
rankings of the assessor are supposed to be based on the individual's abilities. Each item 
is given its own careful consideration and is not to be influenced by previous category 
ranks. Once the interview is complete the assessor is to make a decision with respect to 
the fitness ("final competency") by taking into account the presence of mental disorder 
"in the legal sense," and his overall impression of the psycho-legal abilities of the 
evaluee. This impression is gleaned from a coding sheet that the evaluator fills out after 
the interview with the scores taken for each section. The exact structure of this process is 
not detailed by the authors of the FIT -R. As Grisso (2003) notes: 
And: 
The FIT -R system does not provide any "formulas" 
for combining the item ratings to arrive at this final 
judgment... (Grisso, 2003, p.103); 
Rating criteria for the various items are in the form of a 
paragraph description of the concept covered by each item, 
but without specific guides for 2, 1, or 0 ratings (Ibid, p. 105). 
Grisso concludes, 
The FIT -R manual does not offer specific instructions to 
consider the degree of the defendant's abilities in relation 
to the demands of the defendant's legal situation. However, 
the flexibility of the rating system would allow for such 
judgments to be made, given that the examiner has some 
knowledge of the defendant's trial circumstances (Ibid., p. 107). 
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If the evaluator concludes that the evaluee is, in fact impaireq, the evaluee will be 
"referred for a more thorough evaluation of competence to stand trial" (Roesch, Zapf, & 
Eaves, 2006, p. 36) in order to determine whether or not the mental disorder causes the 
legal impairment. 
The FIT -R is designed "for use as a screening instrument" (Roesch, Zapf, & 
Eaves, 2006, p. 25) in addition to inpatient evaluations of persons whose fitness is 
questionable. This application of the FIT -R, as a screening instrument, is " ... to identify 
as early as possible those individuals who are clearly competent to proceed ... so that they 
can continue their legal proceedings ... " (Roesch, Zapf, & Eaves, 2006, p. 25).50 The 
authors of the FIT -R are aware that fitness is a fluid construct and note that, "[t]his 
instrument is designed to reflect the status of a defendant at the time of examination. It is 
not a predictive instrument" (Roesch, Zapf, & Eaves, 2006, p. 24, original italics). In 
other words, they seem to be aware that trial fitness can and does change over time and 
that the fitness of a person cannot be predicted. While measuring these abilities is 
reflective of the fairness principle that operates in the law, this test also operates to 
reinforce discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability. 
Constructing IrlRationality: The "Thinking Being" Within the FIT-R: 
I argued in Chapter 2 that the discourse of the rational entails several key abilities 
of what it means to think. In order to be thought of as rational, a person must be collected, 
impartial, sensible, reflective, systematic and analytical. Moreover, the rational person is 
logical and able to justify arguments, provide the conditions for actions and plausibly 
50 This usage is one that addresses the issue of due process and trial expediency, an issue to be dealt with in 
the following chapters. 
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explain the arguments or situations to another person. This discourse of the rational takes 
these qualities for granted, assuming that the 'normal' person possesses these abilities. 
The legal realm assumes this characteristic of a person because it assumes that those 
people who come into contact with the law are "fit" by definition. Rationality has 
historically been the defining characteristic that separates humans from other animals 
(Aristotle 1999, p. 9.) and the consequence of this distinction is a fundamental 
assumption that rationality is a characteristic of all humans. The FIT -R test asks several 
questions that require the respondent to explain, provide an account of, or justify actions 
as well as express them in a logical and impartial fashion. The questions employed by the 
FIT -R test are designed to get the respondent to demonstrate how capable he is of 
formulating logical arguments or explanations without being coached. 
In Section I of the FIT -R, the respondent is asked several questions about 
pleading guilty and not guilty. For instance, the respondent is asked, "What does it mean 
when a person pleads not guilty?,,51 Here he is being asked to rationalize the meaning of 
~~' 
pleading not guilty. This question probes for an initial distinction to be made b~tween 
pleading not guilty and pleading guilty. It is followed up with several questions that deal 
with events in a courtroom following a not guilty pleading and the possible outcomes 
thereo£52 
This line of questioning establishes how a person logically connects together the 
meaning of innocence with the way such a plea would unfold in the courtroom and what 
kinds of things the respondent might expect of a lawyer if pleading not guilty is a chosen 
51 Section 1 subsection 5 - Understanding Of Pleas fIrst question (QI) page 42. 
52 Questions in Section 1 Subsection 5 include: Q2 What happens in court to someone who pleads not 
guilty?, Q3 What are the consequences of pleading not guilty?, and Q4 What things might a lawyer do 
when someone wants to plead not guilty? See page 42. 
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option. Similar questions about pleading guilty are also found in this section of the FIT -
R. Not only is the respondent asked to make distinctions between these types of pleas, but 
these questions also attempt to get a sense of the respondent's sense of reality (for 
instance, does he think pleading not guilty will result in being not guilty?), to rationalize 
the plea by describing outcomes, explain what he thinks a lawyer should do, and to 
explain what he understands of the judicial process. 
In Section IT subsection 853 of the FIT -R, there are two questions that attempt to 
measure a person's rational capability: "How do you think you can be defended against 
these charges?"(Question 1) and "How can you explain your way out of these 
charges?"(Question 2). These questions have been highlighted because they seek an 
explanation, justification or rationalization of a defence strategy and they are fundamental 
to the Section 2 requirement of understanding the nature of the proceedings and their 
possible consequences. They reveal to the interviewer the respondent's thought process in 
terms of how he thinks about his situation with respect to the charges he faces. The 
response provided may reveal that person's connection to reality by reflecting how he 
understands the charges and what ways he thinks he can justify his actions. It may also 
reveal the way he understands how various defence strategies can be deployed, providing 
the interviewer with a sense of how this person can make choices with respect to the 
selection of a defence. Another question that will elicit how the respondent thinks about a 
lawyer's obligations or job, his orientation to reality and his ability to employ a strategic 
defence is, "What do you think your lawyer should concentrate on in order to defend you 
best?"(Question 3) This question provides the assessor with ideas about how the 
53 See page 45 of FIT -R for all of the questions that follow. 
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respondent views his case and analyses the situation to deduce what to focus on in terms 
of a defence. 
Section III, subsection 1254 of the FIT -R asks questions that are reflective of how 
the respondent might understand his lawyer's advice and how he can analyze the 
strategies his lawyer might suggest to him. These questions are fundamental to the 
Section 2 requirement of communicating with counsel. Questions such as, "If your 
lawyer can get the DA (prosecutor) to accept a plea bargain wherein you plead guilty to a 
less serious charge in return for the DA dropping a more serious charge, would you agree 
to it? Why or Why not?"(Question 1), and "What will you do if you disagree with your 
lawyer about how to handle yourcaseT (Question 3), ask the respondent to 
hypothetically evaluate his lawyer's performance. The respondent is being asked to 
provide ajustification for accepting or rejecting his lawyer's advice. He is also being 
asked to explain his understanding of what is meant by a plea bargain and what kind of 
impact that might have on him. 
These questions are situational and ask for an analytical or deductive justification 
for potential avenues of behaviour the respondent can take with respect to his lawyer. 
These questions also probe the way the respondent understands his role with respect to 
his lawyer and what he perceives his options to be in terms of communicating with his 
lawyer. These questions seek the reasons the respondent has for strategies that involve his 
lawyer and whether or not the person can justify potentially self-serving strategies. 
The Reasonable Subject: 
54 See page 49 of FIT -R for all the questions that follow. 
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While it is somewhat difficult to separate from the di!)course of rationality, the 
discourse of reasonableness plays an important function in the creation ofa "nonnal" 
person. What distinguishes the discourse of reasonable from that of the rational is that to 
be considered reasonable, a person generally demonstrates characteristics of being 
agreeable, perceptive, thoughtful, and reflective, and is consistent in his responses and 
behaviours. Moreover, the reasonable person is able to make connections, identifying 
steps or stages and think them through. The ability to reason something may be 
intimately linked to being rational in the sense that building an argument or being logical 
necessarily entails being able to identify steps or stages and make connections between 
them, but being able to do these things does not necessarily mean that the connections 
being made can be rationalized. The way a person makes connections between steps or 
stages reveals something about his ability to reason, and the way those connections are 
made demonstrates how the thought process is employed. The FIT -R test also seeks this 
quality as an element in its investigation ofa person's psycholegal abilities. 
Section I subsection 1 ss of the FIT -R test asks for the person to recount::: the events 
that led up to the respondent's current situation and establishes requirement 2 of Section 
2. Questions such as "Can you tell me how you came to be here (in jail)?"(Question 1), 
and "What happened when the police came?"(Question 2) ask the respondent to tell her 
story as she sees it from beginning to end. It reveals the way she makes connections 
between various events and the current outcome of those events. It might demonstrate her 
ability to recall events in a collected and thoughtful and reflective manner. The fonner 
question provides the assessor with infonnation about how the respondent contextualizes 
55 See page 38 of FIT -R. 
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the events leading up to her arrest and also can provide a con,text for the charges the 
respondent is facing. This line of questioning may also reveal the respondent's 
connection to time as it can establish a time frame surrounding the events leading up to 
her arrest and subsequent interview. How this person is able to make historic connections 
allows the assessor insight to the respondent's perception of events, and how they relate 
the various events or stages to one another chronologically and logically. 
Section ill subsection 10 of the FIT -R seeks similar information with questions 
such as: "Tell me how you got arrested. What do the police say that you didT', "What 
actually happened?"(Question 1), "When and where did all of this take place?"(Question 
2), and "Why did the police arrest you?"(Question 3i6 are asking the respondent to 
repeat her story. The questions establish consistency, seek reflectivity and attempt to 
establish how connections between various events are being made. These kinds of 
questions seek to establish the respondent's orientation to time, place and space, as events 
are recounted, which will reveal that person's perception of reality. This line of 
IS 
questioning also seeks information from the respondent that may or may not be consistent 
with police reports. 
"How can you explain your way out of these charges?"(Question 2) and 44What do 
you think your lawyer should concentrate on in order to defend you best?" (Question 3) 
are questions found in Section n subsection 8 of the FIT _R57. While these questions ask 
the respondent to provide an explanation or an analysis (qualities of being rational), they 
ask the respondent to be thoughtful and reflective in order to answer them. The former 
56 Also in section 3 is the following question: "What did you see, hear, do, or thinkT which is a follow up 
question to "Tell me how you got arrested." See page 47 of FIT -R. 
57 See page 45 of FIT -R. 
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question can be used to establish consistency in the respondent's account of events by 
asking her to demonstrate how her version of events allows for her defence. In order to 
instruct her lawyer or at least participate in her defence strategy, the respondent must be 
reflective of the events leading to her arrest. She must also be able to talk about what she 
thinks her lawyer should focus on to strategize a defence reveals. These communicative 
acts reveal thoughtfulness and also consistency between excuse and defence. 
Other questions in Section IT subsection 958, such as "What do you think your 
chances are of being found not guilty?"(Question 1), "Does the court you are going to be 
tried in have authority over you?"(Question 2), and "Do you have to abide by the court's 
decision?" (Question 3) attempt to establish the respondent's connection to reality by 
asking about her relation to the court in terms of whether she thinks the court has 
authority over her, ifshe feels bound to the court's decision and what chances she thinks 
she has of being found not guilty. These kinds of questions also reveal the ability of the 
respondent to think things through and make connections between events even if they 
have not yet occurred. 
While the discourses of the reasonable and rational have been distinguished here, 
it is important to note that they also work together, support each other, and this 
distinction is subtle and tends to be overlooked. The characteristics of being reasonable 
(i.e. agreeable, reflective and consistent) are also found in the rational subject who is 
collected, sensible and systematic. Together they serve to construct the binary of fit/unfit, 
and formulate the hallmark of the "fit" or "normal" person that the law presumes in its 
principles. Moreover, it is the person who is recognized as possessing these important 
58 See page 46 of FIT -R. 
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attributes that is the ideal punishable subject because it is easier to justify holding them 
culpable (responsible) for their decisions and consequences. 
Assessing Culpability: 
The determination of culpability is a direct result of being responsible and 
reasonable. It is the place where people coming into contact with the law are made into 
punishable subjects. Being culpable means being blameworthy or responsible, and in the 
legal realm, is a requirement of being found guilty. A person who is reasonable and 
responsible can be held culpable for his actions. This premise is at work in the law, and it 
is one of the reasons why a person whose fitness is questioned finds himself being 
assessed by the psychiatric system. The FIT -R test seeks to assess culpability in addition 
to a respondent's reasonableness and rationality. But investigating this aspect is relatively 
different than assessing the latter two. Questions in the FIT -R are self-positioning. While 
the responses to questions of rationality and reasonableness come from indirect methods, 
those questions related to culpability are fashioned in such a way as to make the 
, 
'" 
respondent specifically identify himself in relation to his own culpability. The following 
outline of the test's three sections will best illustrate this distinctive style of questions. 
Section I of the FIT -R asks the respondent, "Do you think people might be afraid 
of you because of what you are charged with?"(Subsection 2 - Question 5 p. 39). This 
question seeks self-perception as being harmless or dangerous. It may be followed up 
with probing questions that reveal why this person sees himself in this way, and this 
revelation may in tum dictate how he places himself as blameworthy. Another question 
found in Section I asks, "What questions would you ask your lawyer before you decide 
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whether or not to plead guilty?" (Subsection 6 - Question 5, page 43). This question may 
reveal how the respondent sees himself as culpable by the kinds of questions he says he 
will ask. It reveals his ability to analyse his situation, understand consequences and 
possibly act in his own best interest. 
Questions in Section II of the FIT -R become more obvious to how the respondent 
reveals himself as a culpable and therefore a punishable subject. In this section the 
respondent is directly asked, "Will you plead guilty or not guilty at your trial? Why?" 
(Subsection 7, Question 1, p. 44). This question will uncover how the person intends to 
plead and also the reasons for that choice. The reasoning process or explanation for his 
choice will show the assessor how he places himself in direct relation to his culpability. 
Other questions require the respondent to elaborate upon this answer in a way that 
demonstrates his feeling of culpability or responsibility. For instance: "If you are found 
guilty as charged, what are the possible sentences ajudge could give you?"(Ibid, 
Question 2), "If ajail sentence is received, how long might it be?"(Ibid, Question 3), and 
"What do you think the chances are to be found not guilty?"(Subsection 9 - Qu~stion 1, 
page 46) are probative of how the respondent understands culpability as it applies to his 
situation. They may also reveal the way the respondent perceives the applicability of guilt 
to himself and the meaning of guilt that the respondent has. 
Section ill consists of some hypothetical situational questions like: "If your 
lawyer can get the DA (prosecutor) to accept a plea bargain wherein you plead guilty to a 
less serious charge in return for the DA dropping a more serious charge, would you agree 
to it? Why or why not?"(Subsection 12 - Question 1, page 49) and "Suppose your lawyer 
finds a way of getting your charges dropped. Would that make you happy? Would you go 
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along with his or her plans?" (Subsection 13, Question 1, pag~ 50). These questions ask 
for the respondent's reaction. This reaction can reveal how the respondent sees himself as 
culpable for his actions and how he sees his situation. Clearly, the questions being asked 
are self positioning for the respondent because they reveal something important about 
how the person relates himself to his situation. 
The Intimate Relationship between Rationality, Reasonableness &: Culpability: 
The concepts and discourses between reason, rationality, and culpability are 
intimately related. These discourses work together, and support each other to provide the 
criteria of what is meant by "fit" as the defining characteristic of the punishable subject. 
The law takes special care to ensure the worthiness of the subjects who come before it as 
punishable subjects. This care stems from the recognition that an accused must be able to 
fully participate in a trial by being able to adequately participate in the process and to 
confront his accusers. This requirement has its roots in the fairness principle. 
The law assumes that the people who are governed by it and come into conflict 
with it are equal. In this assumption of equality, the ideas of innocence and fitness are 
embedded. Thus all accused persons coming before the law are assumed to be both 
innocent and fit. Fitness is a necessary requirement of being a punishable subject as it 
establishes the accused person as a specific kind of punishable subject, namely a 
calculating, rational actor who has control over himself and who makes specific 
choices.59 
59 Cesar Beccaria (1995), for instance, thought that criminals commit crimes by choice and are able to 
control their behaviour. 
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I argue that the construction offit/unfit and therefore punishable subject comes 
from the discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability working in unison. As 
the law governs the citizens of a community, it fundamentally assumes that all those 
whom it oversees share the same basic qualities and thus are equally accountable to it. So, 
the citizen is constructed as "normal" or "fit" by the assumption of the abilities that 
demarcate qualities of rationality and reasonableness. In other words, the citizen is 
assumed to be logical, impartial, sensible and analytical, able to assess his existential 
situation and undertake actions using these abilities. This assessment implies the ability 
to connect steps or stages and events together, thinking them through and generally being 
consistent in his thoughts and actions. The reasonable and rational person embodying 
these abilities can be held culpable for his actions and their outcomes because his 
existential understanding is predicated on them and their use. 
The combination of the concepts and discourses of the reasonable, the rational and 
the culpable reinforce the principles of fairness, welfare and autonomy. These principles 
work together to construct the fundamental basis of the law. Their reinforcemdt by these 
discourses helps to give the law its authority because they construct the kind of citizen 
who will be responsive to the law and its governing powers. The normal, idealized 
individual is constructed using these concepts. As a result, the law assumes people are 
equally capable decision makers. Moreover, as part of a liberal western tradition, the 
individuality of people is held in the highest regard and so the principle of autonomy 
expresses the desire for treating others as equal citizens capable of making personal 
decisions for which they can be responsible.6oThe law is used to ensure the welfare of 
60 Here is where I see the usefulness of existentialism as a philosophy. 
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people who are collected in society because it is thought that~ as hedonistic choice 
makers, people will sometimes hurt others in an attempt to maximize their oWn 
pleasure.61 
The FIT -R is a test designed with the law in mind. It specifically takes the three 
criteria of Section 2 of the Criminal Code and uses them to construct questions that will 
enable an evaluator to see how a person's abilities match up with the ideal citizen. In 
other words, the FIT -R is an attempt to measure how a person evaluates her own 
existential situation and also to demonstrate the kinds of processes that she employs to 
make decisions. This examination allows the evaluator to make comments about how the 
subject fills the expectations of the law and whether or not the accused will be able to 
make existential decisions in the context of the legal realm. If an accused demonstrates an 
inability to make decisions that are thought to be credible, then her ability to do so in the 
legal context becomes questionable and may put the law into a position of unjustness. 
The rigor of the FIT -R seems to be detailed enough so as to make the evaluation as 
comprehensive as possible. 
61 Assuming the argument from Jeremy Bentham is correct. 
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Chapter 4: Fitness At Work - Precedent Setting Canadian Cases 
I have selected two cases that have been significant to the development of the 
legal processes in Canada which affect the mentally disordered in order to demonstrate 
how the discourses of rationality, reason, and culpability are at work in the law and how 
they help create the fit and therefore punishable subject. Before I turn my attention to 
these two cases, it is important to acknowledge the significance of the case ofR. v. Swain 
(1990) in 1he development of the law with respect to the mentally disordered. In 1990, the 
outcome of 1his case revolutionized 1he way the Canadian legal system approaches 1he 
mentally disordered accused. It was after this case that the Canadian Criminal Code was 
revised to change the terminology of the insanity defence to 1hat of "not guilty by reason 
of mental disorder". It also reaffirmed the rights of an accused to not be unduly 
incarcerated and to choose his own defence.62 The decision to allow a fit accused to 
choose his own defence regardless ofwhe1her or not it serves his own best interest 
reaffirmed 1he principle of autonomy in Canadian law. This principle has had a long 
standing tradition in Western 1hought. Both the Kantian (deontological) and Mil!sian 
(utilitarian) ethical traditions have emphasized respect for persons as rational and 
autonomous creatures because dignity is grounded in these qualities. 
In 1his chapter I trace the concepts of rationality, reasonableness, and autonomy as 
they can be found in 1he cases of R v. Taylor (1992) and R v. Whittle (1994). I chose 
Taylor because 1his case has had a lasting and important impact on 1he way the Canadian 
legal system deals wi1h accused individuals whose fitness is in question. The case of 
Taylor highlights some of the difficulties unfit accused can present to 1he court system. I 
62 See chapter one above. 
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chose to examine Whittle because the issue of fitness in this case is broadened to 
encompass pre-court procedures and how an accused's fitness before trial can be 
important to the way it is handled in the trial. The analysis of these two cases also serves 
to demonstrate some of the inconsistencies and contradictions that can be found in their 
application as the courts attempt to create punishable subjects out of the mentally 
disordered. These concepts and principles are important elements of the culpable subject 
who is therefore punishable. The normative standard for culpability includes meeting the 
criteria of a reasonable, rational and autonomous subject. The qualities of this type of 
person have been outlined in Chapter 2 and, in Chapter 3 their import and application are 
presented in the evaluation ofa person's psycho-legal abilities. Meeting these criteria 
means that a person who is being held accountable, culpable or blameworthy for an 
action, is also potentially punishable and subject to some form oflegal sanction. The 
following examination of the Taylor and Whittle cases illustrates the struggle of the 
courts to utilize the understanding of these discourses in order to ensure that the accused 
individuals who are facing the judicial system are "qualified" to do so. !5 
As noted earlier in Chapters 1 and 2, the law provides special provisions for 
dealing with those people whose actions are thought to be performed unknowingly, or out 
of duress, and the like. The logic used to justify these provisions is that only an actor who 
fully intends his actions can be held truly culpable for them. Thus an actor who 
undertakes an action that is contrary to the law and whose intentions are impaired in some 
way is not held to the same level of culpability as an actor whose behaviour is 
unimpaired. In its attempt to recognize the situations that are unique or rare, the law 
makes provisions to except certain individuals from being held culpable for their actions 
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and thus exculpates them from punishment, or at least metes put punishments that are 
tempered with the consideration of an impairment. Despite the attempt to recognize these 
unique circumstances, starting with the determination of the "fit" subject, the law seems 
to contrarily be using examinations of difference, in this case, mental disorder, to lower 
the standards generally held to be normative in order to have people moved through the 
criminal justice system as culpable, and therefore punishable, subjects. The cases of 
Taylor and Whittle will bring these inconsistencies and contradictions to light. 
R. v. Taylor: 
The case of R. v. Taylor is a significant one in Canadian legal history as the 
Supreme Court of Canada established that the cognitive requirements of a fit defendant 
do not have to be any more than "limited." This means that an accused defendant must 
only be aware of the nature and objective of the proceedings and be able to assist counsel 
in coming up with a defence by relating facts to counsel. It is not necessary that the 
defendant be able to foresee consequences or choose a strategy that is in his own best 
.' interests but only that he is aware that punishment may be an outcome. I argue that there 
are important contradictions and inconsistencies in how the concepts of rationality, 
reasonableness, culpability, and autonomy are considered in these two leading cases, 
Taylor and Whittle. Moreover, these inconsistencies make the application of the limited 
cognitive test difficult to implement as I will demonstrate in Chapter five. 
In 1987, Taylor was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and possessing 
a weapon. After his arrest, he was psychiatrically assessed and found unfit to stand trial. 
In April 1987, he was found fit to stand trial after a review by the Lieutenant Governor's 
Board of Review (LGBR) and a preliminary trial was held on August 19. At his first 
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appearance in the District Court of Ontario on November 9, he was found unfit to stand 
trial and remanded into the custody of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health 
Centre. In June 1988, the LGBR found Taylor to be fit for trial and the judge agreed. The 
outcome of Taylor's original trial was delivered on October 14, 1988; Taylor was found 
not guilty by reason of insanity and was "ordered detained in strict custody." 
This verdict was set aside on August 21, 1991 and a new trial was ordered on the 
basis ofR. v. Swain (1990)63 because the Crown introduced evidence of the appellant's 
insanity. On February 12, 1992, Taylor brought an application of habeas corpus64 with 
certiorari65 in aid and pursuant to S. 1 O( c) and 24 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms66 seeking to quash his committal to trial and the certificate of involuntary 
committal. Habeas corpus was dismissed on February 12, 1992 and on March 24,1992, 
Justice Wren found Taylor to be unfit for trial. On May 7, 1992, Taylor was also found 
unfit by the Ontario Criminal Court Review Board. Taylor appealed these judgments. 
The appeal court examined several documents relating to the fitness of Taylor 
stemming from the proceedings of March 24, 1992. At this time, Taylor dismissed his 
court-appointed counsel claiming that counsel was "an incompetent fraud" and was then 
arraigned and did not have to plead. Psychiatric reports were provided to Taylor about 
himself and the hearing proceeded. Psychiatric reports from Dr. Cameron, who had 
Taylor in his care for almost two years, indicated that Taylor was diagnosed as suffering 
63 For details ofR v Swain, see Chapter 1 above, pp. 20-1. 
64 A writ issued to bring somebody who has been detained into court, usually for a decision on whether or 
not the detention is lawful. 
65 A writ of certiorari is a form of judicial review whereby a court is asked to consider a legal decision of an 
administrative tribunal,judicial office or organization (e.g. government) and to decide if the decision has 
been regular and complete or if there has been an error oflaw. 
66 See Appendix A (Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
from paranoid schizophrenia and was thought to be dangerous and unable to care or 
provide for himself67 Dr. Cameron thought Taylor was unfit to stand trial because he 
thought Taylor would be unable to instruct counsel given his delusions and paranoia.68 
Both Drs. Cameron and McDonald admitted that Taylor was "technically fit" in 
the sense that he understood the nature and object of the proceedings, the role of the 
various players in the process and the judicial process, but noted that Taylor would be 
"unable to instruct counsel in a manner that would be in his best interests" (R v. Taylor, 
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1992, p. 7). Taylor was advised by his counsel that it was not appropriate to testifY at the 
fitness hearing, but he insisted on doing so any way stating that he was able to work with 
his counsel, that they agreed on a defence strategy and that he did not believe there was 
any kind of conspiracy against him. Ultimately, Justice Wren found Taylor unfit to stand 
trial concluding that while Taylor (who was a lawyer at one time) understood the 
proceedings, was articulate and bright, could not "perceive his own best interests and how 
those interests should be addressed in the conduct of a trial" (R v. Taylor, 1992, p. 8). 
Thus the judge concluded that, "I am content that the accused person in this cas~ is not 
capable to rationally instruct counsel, or rationally conduct a case, or rationally 
communicate with counsel because of his mental disorder" (R v. Taylor, 1992, p. 8). 
In May 1992, a disposition hearing was held by the Ontario Criminal Court 
Review Board (OCeRB). The result of this hearing ultimately found that Taylor, while 
67 See Appendix B (Ont Mental Health Act - conditions for involuntary commitment.) 
68 Other psychiatric reports came to the following conclusions: 
Dr. Jones, Oct 30, 1991 - " ... unable to participate meaningfully in the proceedings as his delusional 
thinking would preclude accurate perception of the events occurring before him" Dr. McDonald, Mar 1 0, 
1992 -"I do not believe he is fit to stand trial. He cannot be dealt with rationally." (R v. Taylor, 1992, p. 6) 
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intellectually capable of instructing counsel, would, because of his delusions, act in a 
manner counterproductive to his own best interests. The Board further "held that, as a 
result of the appellant's mental disorder and his delusions with respect to the criminal 
justice system, he could not communicate meaningfully with counsel nor participate in 
his own defence" (R v. Taylor, 1992, p. 8). Thus the board found Taylor unfit to stand 
trial. Taylor was given ample time during his appeal of habeas corpus to present his case, 
but the court found his submissions wholly unhelpful and eventually turned its attention 
to the amicus curiae69 portion of the appeal. Taylor refused to attend this portion of the 
proceedings claiming that he was not being provided enough time to finish his argument 
of habeas corpus. The appeal continued without Taylor, and the limited cognitive test was 
developed: 
Under the 'limited cognitive capacity' test propounded by the 
amicus curiae, the presence of delusions does not vitiate the 
accused's fitness to stand trial unless the delusion distorts the 
accused's rudimentary understanding of the judicial process. It is 
submitted under this test, a court's assessment of an accused's 
ability to conduct a defence and to communicate and instruct coqnsel 
is limited to an inquiry whether an accused can recount to hislhe} . 
counsel the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a way that 
counsel can then properly present a defence. It is not relevant to the 
fitness determination to consider whether the accused ... ultimately 
makes decisions that are in hislher best interests (R v. Taylor, 1992,. 
P. 12 Section 44, emphasis added) 
The Court's Justification for Limited Cognitive Capacity 
The logic that is used to justify these conclusions by the Court is that the higher 
threshold of posses sing analytical reasoning abilities might result in more people being 
declared unfit for trial and this outcome would conflict with the notion of due process. 
69 Somebody whose counsel provides information to a court on legal issues involved in a case. 
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The court stated that, "The adoption of too high a threshold for fitness will result in an 
increased number of cases in which the accused will be found unfit to stand trial even 
though the accused is capable of understanding the process and anxious for it to come to 
completion" (R v. Taylor, 1992, p. 13). Moreover, such a criterion would interfere with 
the ability of an accused person to choose her own defence because she would be 
excluded from the trial process as an unfit person. The court also argued that: 
And, 
In addition, adopting a high threshold of fitness, including a "best 
interests" component, derogates from the fundamental principle 
that an accused is entitled to choose his own defence and present it 
as he chooses. In R. v. Swain ... Lamer C.lC., for the majority, 
stressed the importance of the accused person's S. 7 right to liberty, 
which allows him to control his own defence. An accused person 
who has not been found unfit to stand trial must be permitted to 
conduct his own defence, even ifit means that the accused 
may act to his own detriment in doing so. The autonomy of the 
accused in the adversarial system requires that the accused should 
be able to make such fundamental decisions and assume the risks 
involved (Section 51). 
The "limited cognitive capacity" test strikes an effective balance 
between the objectives of the fitness rules and the constitutional :;: 
right of the accused to choose his own defence and to have a trial 
within a reasonable time (Section 52). 
The reasoning employed in Section 51 has existential implications in the sense 
that the adversarial system assumes a "fit" person who is able to choose her own defence. 
Not only does the accused get to choose the defence that will be presented to the court in 
answer to the charges against her, but it is also assumed that the accused will be able to 
accept the consequences that may follow from such a defence whether successful or not. 
This assumption has embedded in it ideas of autonomy and choice making that are 
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clearly outlined in Sartre (197Sfo and are to be viewed as important to the way the 
human condition is conceived. Sartre's existentialist philosophy embraces the idea of the 
human being as fundamentally a choice-making agent that is always in the process of 
becoming and is responsible for the consequences of its choices (Sartre, 1975, p. 350). 
The law too assumes this of the accused; the accused knew what he was doing when he 
contravened the law and is therefore accountable for the consequences. It is 
contradictory, however, to use the court's reasoning to justifY a lower threshold of 
cognitive capacity because the assumption of being a choice maker demands an ability to 
choose on the basis of potential foreseen consequences and then acting, presumably in 
one's own best interest. The logic of claiming that the adoption of a higher threshold of 
cognitive capacity to include a "best interests" component somehow derogates from the 
ability of an accused to choose his own defence is also contrary to the idea of autonomy. 
If an accused person launches a defence that others think is detrimental to her own best 
interests, it does not mean that she is not acting in what she believes to be her own best 
interests. 
The limited cognitive ability test is also contradictory to the principles of justice. 
Having a higher threshold is something that encourages autonomous behaviour and is a 
part of our understanding of the "normal" or "fit" accused person. I argue that lowering 
this threshold for the mentally disordered in order to include them in the category of "fit" 
is contradictory to the principles of justice. While the reasoning behind these statements 
of the court is likely designed to avoid a paternalistic undertone to the way the law 
approaches mentally disordered subjects, it is highly problematic that the same standard 
70 See chapter one above. 
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is not applied to all accused persons entering the criminal justice system, since the 
principles upon which the criminal justice system is based assume the equality of all 
accused persons to begin with. "Fit" persons are presumed to have a basic understanding 
of the court proceedings and are able to participate in their trials in a meaningful way, but 
they are also assumed to have an ability to act autonomously by choosing strategies that 
are presumably in their own best interests. The threshold of cognitive capacity for non-
mentally disordered accused persons is, then, in reality, much higher than that outlined by 
the "limited cognitive capacity" requirement sketched out here. 
R v. Whittle: 
This case is important to the mentally disordered because it establishes that fitness 
does not change with respect to different aspects of the trial process. In other words, 
one's competency to waive counsel is the same standard as waiving the right to silence 
and also to stand trial. The limited cognitive test in fitness is the same as the "operating 
" 
mind" test71 employed in the confession rule which occurs prior to the trial. 
Douglas Whittle was arrested based on warrants for outstanding fines. He 
appeared to be mentally unstable to the officers who arrested him and while he was in 
custody, Whittle claimed that he wanted to confess to the murder of Frank Dowson. 
Officers informed Whittle of his right to counsel who indicated that he understood this 
right, but did not wish to exercise it. Whittle offered to show the officers the place where 
he disposed of the murder weapon and agreed to make a videotaped statement. His rights 
71 Page 19: "The operating mind test, therefore, requires that the accused possess a limited degree of 
cognitive ability to understand what he or she is saying and to comprehend that the evidence may be used 
in proceedings against the accused." 
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were reiterated to him, and his videotaped statements ceased when he indicated he wished 
to consult with a lawyer. Although he was advised to remain silent by his lawyer, Whittle 
claimed he needed to continue his confession because of the voices in his head and 
resumed his videotaped statement. Although some of his statements were bizarre, 
Whittle's evidentiruy statements were supported by physical evidence. Prior to going to 
trial, Whittle was assessed for fitness and the results supported his fitness. 
A voir dire72 was held at Whittle's trial on a charge offirst degree murder at 
which both Crown and defence psychiatrists testified that Whittle suffers from 
schizophrenia, a symptom of which is auditory hallucinations. The defence psychiatrist 
testified that Whittle was able to understand what he was saying, what was said to him 
and the court process. Whittle was also said to be fit to instruct counsel, but that the 
voices in his head demanding that he "unburden himself' made the consequences of his 
statements irrelevant to him. The trial judge found that while Whittle's statements were 
voluntruy in the traditional sense, they should be excluded because his rights under s. 
10(b) of the Charter were violated73• The trial judge, who accepted the defence:; 
psychiatrist's evidence, concluded that Whittle's "psychological condition prevented him 
from an awareness of the consequences which would flow from giving the statements, 
and that this inability to appreciate what was at stake nullified any alleged waiver of his 
right to counsel" (R v. Whittle, 1994, p . 3). Statements made by Whittle after his 
psychiatric evaluation were found to be in violation ofs. 10(b) of the Charter and were 
also excluded by the trial judge. Whittle was acquitted after the Crown declined to call 
72 The preliminary examination of a witness or juror to determine his or her competency to give or hear 
evidence. 
73 The Canadian Charter of Rights guarantees the right to legal counsel in section 10 h. 
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further evidence. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial af\er finding that "the statements 
were admissible and that the trial judge erred. 
Justice Sopinka stated: 
... the accused had "the requisite degree of mental competence to make 
the choices inherent in the confession rule, the right to silence and the right 
to counsel. The "operating mind" test, which is an aspect of the confession 
rule, includes a limited mental component which requires that the accused 
have sufficient cognitive capacity to understand what he is saying and what 
is being said. This [capacity] includes the ability to understand a caution that 
the evidence can be used against "the accused. The same standard applies 
with respect to the right to silence in determining whether the accused has 
the mental capacity to make an active choice. In exercising the right to 
counselor waiving the right, the accused must possess the limited cognitive 
capacity that is required for fitness to stand trial. The accused must be 
capable of communicating with counsel to instruct counsel, and understand 
the function of counsel and that he can dispense with counsel even if this is 
not in the accused's best interests. It is not necessary that the accused 
possess analytic ability. ... Inner compulsion, due to conscience or 
otherwise, cannot displace the finding of an "operating mind" unless, in 
combination with a conduct of a person in authority, a statement is found to 
be involuntary (R. v. Whittle, 1994, pp.3-4). 
Both of the cases above suggest that the law needs to employ a "limited cognitive 
test" in order to meet the requirements of due process and the autonomy of an individual 
to choose her own defence. I argue that the limited cognitive test is employed not for 
reasons of expediency or due process as identified by these cases, but to create punishable 
subjects. The focus of the FIT -R is to investigate the abilities of an accused to make 
decisions as well as to assess his abilities to understand the judicial process. Christopher 
Slobogin (2004), following an argument by Richard Bonnie (1992/1993), suggests that 
competence (fitness) can be divided into two aspects: adjudicative competence and 
decisional competence. He describes these two types of competence in the following 
way: 
Adjudicative competency requires that the person understand the 
criminal process and be able to communicate relevant facts to the 
players in the system. Decisional competence, in contrast, is only 
required when the defendant is entitled to make a decision about his 
or her case, such as whether to plead guilty (Slobogin, 2006, p. 192). 
The Whittle case con:tl.ates decision making ability with adjudicative 
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understanding by equating the operating mind test with the limited cognitive ability test. 
Of course Whittle deals with pre-trial decisions, but the result of suggesting that the 
capacity of a person making decisions about how to proceed prior to trial is equated to 
that of decisions made during trial has implications that are far reaching in terms of how 
one proceeds in his defence strategy. The limited cognitive test reduces decision making 
to a mere understanding of the criminal process and the ability to relate facts to a lawyer. 
This means that a person does not have to be able to act in his own best interest and a 
person's decisional competence is neglected in favour of a more rudimentary kind of 
fitness that may render more subjects culpable by understanding them as fit subjects. 
I argue that the law ought to include the appreciation of acting in one's own best 
Ii< 
interest since that kind of action seems to be embedded in the idea of what it means to be 
autonomous and therefore results injustice. Ifbeing able to act in one's own best interest 
is a re:tl.ection of the exercise of one's autonomy (regardless of success or failure of 
outcome), then con:tl.ating merely understanding of the judicial process with the ability to 
make decisions in one's own best interests (as re:tl.ected by an ability to at least consider 
alternatives) is highly problematic. If a person is decision ally incompetent, then he should 
not be held culpable for actions that are contrary to the law, since presumably that person 
cannot make rational choices with respect to actions. It should not be assumed that an 
individual is acting autonomously when contravening the law ifhis decisional capacity is 
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compromised, even if the issue of fitness is specifically related to an accused's mental 
abilities with respect to the trial. Therefore it is problematic to separate the ability to 
make decisions specifically for trial issues from being able to make decisions in general, 
since there does not appear to be a significant qualitative difference with respect to the 
decision making process. It could be argued that specific decisions for legal purposes 
differ from making decisions in general, but it is not clear what criteria one would apply 
to make that distinction. 
Decision making abilities are relational in nature to circumstances and, as Veil 
and Hoff (1 999 pp. 6-7) argue, so too should fitness be regarded. In other words, the idea 
that fitness or competence as a characteristic is further problematised by attempting to 
incorporate the ability to make decisions into a test designed along the lines of 
adjudicative competence as outlined in Section 2 of the c.c.c. Clearly in the case of 
Taylor, the trial court found that being unable to act in one's own best interest meant that 
Taylor was thought to be decisionally incompetent. Both the psychiatrists and the trial 
court judge make the distinction between adjudicative understanding and decisign-
making abilities. They agreed that because Taylor's delusions about the legal system 
stemmed from his schizophrenia he would be unable to effectively cooperate with 
counsel and ultimately would act to his own detriment. The Supreme Court reversed this 
decision, effectively stating that these criteria (of higher cognitive functions or best 
interests), interfere with due process and would potentially create large numbers of unfit 
persons. Persons who are unfit cannot be tried, and therefore they are not able to be held 
culpable and therefore punishable for their actions. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada also reversed the deci~ion made in the case of 
Whittle where the Appeal court judge rendered inadmissible several statements that 
Whittle made to the police about his guilt with respect to murder. The Supreme Court of 
Canada ultimately decided that Whittle demonstrated adjudicative competence and that it 
was unnecessary to take into consideration his compulsion to confess that stemmed from 
his mental disorder. Therefore, in effect the reasons for Whittle's course of action are not 
taken into consideration in any way. The statements he made were supported by physical 
evidence and the court chose to make Whittle a culpable subject even though his 
decisions to confess were influenced by a mental disorder. 
The analysis demonstrates that the limited cognitive test conflicts with the 
principle of autonomy and its assumptions with respect to the ideal punishable subject. 
The principle of autonomy assumes that individuals have the ability to make choices 
based on their ability to weigh the consequences of those choices. It is also implied in this 
principle that people are acting in their own best interests when they are making those 
" 
'" 
choices. The limited cognitive test does not require accused individuals to possess any 
analytic or higher reasoning capability in order to be fit to stand trial. This criteria means 
that acting in one's own best interese4 is not a requirement for being processed in the 
74 Acting in one's own best interests means that choices and their potential outcomes can be logically 
assessed and a position or decision is made, irrespective of whether or not the decision or defence is 
successful. In other words, the ability of a person to choose a course of action as he/she reacts to his/her 
existential situation is important to the concept of autonomy; the failure of a certain course of action or 
decision does not render the decision-maker incapable, rather it reveals the ability to make mistakes in 
the assessment of one's situation and this too is an important part of autonomy. This idea is returned to 
in Chapter 5. 
83 
criminal justice system even though the actor is assumed to have been working on a 
similar kind of principle when he chose to commit an act that contravenes the law.75 
Moreover, the deployment of the concepts of rationality and reasonableness in the 
two cases outlined above presents a conflict of practice with theory. The FIT -R is 
designed to establish the ability of an accused individual to participate in a trial. The 
design, as traced in Chapter 3, demonstrates that a higher level of analytical reasoning is 
embedded in the notion of the autonomous individual. The questions that comprise the 
FIT -R drive at how much understanding an individual has of the criminal process and his 
awareness of what it means to be processed in the criminal justice system. These 
questions probe for an accused individual's ability to participate in the trial process. In 
the case ofR v. Taylor, the accused was found initially unfit for trial, then fit and then 
unfit and finally was found able to stand trial with the result of being found not guilty by 
reason of in sanity. 76 When the Swain case was heard, the rules surrounding common law 
practice for the mentally disordered changed. It was decided that a defendant needs to be 
," 
able to present his own defence regardless of whether or not it is in his own best interests. 
Thus, it was also decided during Swain that the Crown could not introduce evidence of a 
mental disorder to the court unless the accused who is not pleading insanity puts into 
question his mental abilities. The result meant that the Taylor case was revisited in 1992, 
since it was decided that the Crown's introduction of evidence of mental disorder was a 
reversible error. 
75 This assumption of best interests in terms of acting criminally to begin with is appealing to Rational 
Choice theory. 
76 Original trial was held in 1987/8 and therefore "insanity" was the operational term used to currently 
describe Not Guilty By Reason of Mental Disorder (S. 16) 1991. 
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Expert witnesses called upon to assess Taylor's fitne~s in his 1992 trial, 
concluded that he was unfit for trial because he was unable to participate meaningfully in 
the trial, be dealt with rationally or instruct counsel because of his delusions. Justice 
Wren agreed with this assessment of Taylor and deemed him unfit to stand trial because 
he would not be able to rationally instruct counsel, conduct a case, or communicate with 
counsel and this decision was reaffirmed by the OCCRB in its assessment of Taylor. 
Fitness is understood here as something that requires the autonomous capability to 
foresee the consequences of an action and accept responsibility for them by acting in 
one's own best interests. It appears that the court and OCCRB understand rationality as 
being collected, impartial, reflective, analytical, systematic and sensible. These qualities, 
according to the assessments of Taylor are missing or impaired by Taylor's mental 
disorder and paranoia. Presumably, it is expected that communicating with counsel must 
occur in a logical, systematic and sensible way if one is to present a defence in his own 
best interest. Dr. Jones' testimony in 1991 at Taylor's fitness hearing states: " ... in my 
view, he would be unable to participate meaningfully in the proceedings as his tdelusional 
thinking would preclude accurate perception of the events occurring before him" (R. v. 
Tay/or, 1992, p. 6). 
In 1992, Dr. McDonald stated that "he [Taylor] cannot be dealt with rationally" 
since he refused to cooperate with a defence psychiatrist and believed himself to be the 
victim ofa conspiracy" (R. v. Tay/or, 1992, p. 7). Moreover, Dr. McDonald stated that 
despite the technical understanding Taylor had of the judicial process, he was unable to 
distinguish reality from fantasy and that "his thinking is rambling and disjointed and at 
times thoroughly irrational" (R. v. Tay/or, 1992, p. 7). Justice Wren concluded that the 
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evidence put forth by these experts was satisfactOIY to render a judgment to the effect that 
Taylor was unfit for trial. In May 1992, a review of Taylor's case was held by the 
OCCRB where upon Dr. Cameron, in cross examination stated that Taylor "lacks certain 
abstractions and is unable to reason on higher cognitive levels" with the result that "he 
will inevitably act in a way that's counterproductive or not in his best interest" (R. v. 
Taylor, 1992, p. 8). 
Taylor's behavior could not be categorized as reasonable if we take into 
consideration the characteristics of being agreeable (he refused to cooperate with counsel 
and psychiatrists), thoughtful, reflective and consistent (first claimed a conspiracy against 
him and then insisted he had no such delusions and that he was prepared to assist counsel 
as assigned to him). Ifbeing reasonable and rational are requirements of being culpable, 
and therefore punishable, as argued above, then it appears that Taylor should be found 
unfit for trial and that the criteria of higher reasoning and the ability to act in one's own 
best interest was being carefully considered in the initial reassessment of his case. In 
other words, it appears that Justice Wren's decision to declare Taylor unfit is co.,nsistent 
with the discourses of rationality and reasonableness as well as in accord with the 
principle of autonomy. 
The Court of Appeal undermines this understanding of what it means to be fit by 
rejecting the requisite for a higher analytical ability. This rejection may be an 
unconsidered consequence of the Swain case, since the focus of Swain was on violations 
of Charter rights. It was in Swain that the practice of indefinite incarceration for persons 
found not guilty by reason of mental disorder was abandoned. Moreover, the issue of the 
Crown raising evidence of mental disorder to obtain a verdict it believes was in the best 
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interests of the defendant, resulted in the statement that a defendant must be able to 
present his own defence regardless of whether or not it is in his own best interest. The 
logic used to justify this declaration was the principle of autonomy. Here in the Taylor 
case, this proclamation that one need not act in one's own best interest when choosing a 
defence works to undermine the principle of autonomy, and also to render punishable 
subjects who may not be able to participate meaningfully in their own trial. The Court of 
Appeal found that cooperation between the accused and his counsel, or making decisions 
that are ultimately in one's own best interests are not a requirement of being fit (R. v. 
Taylor, 1992, p. 12). 
In the following chapter I explore a selection of cases dealing with the issue of 
fitness after Taylor and Whittle. These cases serve to further demonstrate the conflicts of 
competing principles at work in the law, as well as to show how the discourses of 
rationality, reasonableness and culpability are practically deployed by and through the 
law. This critical analysis helps to make clear the way binaries are reinforced by these 
discourses and how the punishable subject is created or maintained by them. 
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Chapter 5: Applying Fitness Criteria Post Taylor and Whittle 
The previous chapter provided an analysis and overview of two Canadian legal 
cases that have had a significant impact upon the way fitness is defined or thought about 
by the law. In the case of Taylor it was established that "limited cognitive ability" is all 
that is required to be considered fit to stand trial. The Whittle case is significant because it 
is here that the Courts declared that there is no difference in mental capacities or abilities 
during pre-trial encounters with the law. Conflating these limited abilities is contrary to 
the notion of the autonomous, responsible, culpable being. The concept of autonomy 
draws to mind the idea that a person who is autonomous makes decisions based on 
specific abilities to weigh options and perceive outcomes that will, in the selection of a 
course of action, be in one's own best interest. The courts have determined that acting in 
one's own best interest is not a requirement for proceeding in legal matters even though 
the law presumes this ability as a characteristic of the accused's actions which have 
brought him into conflict with the law. The only requirement for proceeding with trial 
matters is a rudimentary understanding of one's legal predicament, but no deep~r 
cognitive capacity or appreciation is needed to be processed in the legal system from the 
time of arrest until the time of trial. As noted above, the court's justification for taking 
this position is grounded in the principle of fairness which embraces the issue of due 
process or a speedy trial. In Canada, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by Section 
ll(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
In this chapter, I examine a small selection of provincial Court of Appeal cases 
that demonstrate the way Taylor and Whittle have been applied. These cases were 
selected from a variety of cases provided to me by a legal expert familiar with fitness 
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issues. My decision to use these three cases was made for se~eral reasons: 1) the cases 
were not limited to Ontario, demonstrating that this problem is not localized, 2) these 
cases were the most detailed of the selection providing me with more material to readily 
analyse, not that an analysis of the others was inapplicable, 3) the Xu case most 
poignantly demonstrates the continuing challenges faced by jurists who must preside over 
fitness cases, and 4) the commonality of the mental disorder does not obscure the 
intelligence of the accused which further problematizes the idea of the meaning of 
"unfitness." In this examination, the continuing and problematic contradictions between 
trial expediency and fitness at work in the law will be exposed. This analysis illustrates 
that a determination of fitness is often at the expense of trial expediency, and that 
administrative pressures in the Court and the Charter right to a speedy trial is privileged 
over the needs of the accused. These cases expose the necessity fur balancing the issue of 
trial fitness against that of expediency in order to ensure that justice (both criminal and 
social) is properly executed. 
The first case I will examine is that of R v. Pietrangelo (2001). This cas~ came 
before the Ontario Court of Appeal after Pietrangelo was convicted of attempted murder 
and assault with a weapon after he attacked and beat the mayor of Niagara Falls in his 
office. Pietrangelo' s conviction was appealed on 1he grounds that he was not fit to stand 
trial, and that he was not afforded an opportunity to question jurors about 1he influences 
of the media exposure of his case on them (challenge for cause7\ Pietrangelo, acting as 
his own lawyer, wanted to question the jurors about their potential media bias. The nature 
77 A challenge for cause is a party's request that the judge dismiss a potential juror from serving on a trial 
jury by providing a valid legal reason for why that person shouldn't serve. For example, potential bias - in 
this case the pUblicity of the case could have unfairly influenced the jurors. 
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of this case was such that the Court of Appeal determined th~t the only proper way to 
determine this bias was to get individualized statements from the jurors, rather than the 
general query the trial judge used to excuse jurors from duty.78 
The Crown raised the issue of fitness during the trial where it presented a 
psychiatric report that made it "unequivocally clear" that Pietrangelo was not fit to stand 
trial. The trial judge did not hold a fitness inquiry when the issue was presented to him. 
The trial judge dealt with the issue by asking Pietrangelo ifhe was fit to stand trial and 
continued when Pietrangelo answered affirmatively.79 The Court of Appeal found that the 
trial judge erred by proceeding in this fashion and determined that there were ample 
grounds on which to hold a fitness hearing before proceeding with the trial. The grounds 
to warrant a fitness hearing included Pietrangelo's behaviour and the psychiatric report 
submitted by the Crown at his original trial. Pietrangelo did not appear to understand the 
nature and object of his trial as he insisted that he be allowed to call the "entire body of 
the City of Niagara Falls as witnesses" and that the reason he understood to be in court at 
all had to do with addressing his father's will. Pietrangelo insisted that he woula not 
participate in the trial process until his own witnesses had come to court and his father's 
will was addressed in court (R v. Pietrangelo, 2001, p. 4). 
Although the overview of this case is brief, the concepts of rationality, 
reasonableness and culpability are at work here. The Appeal court is suggesting that 
78 ''In the circumstances of this case the impact of the pre-trial publicity on prospective jurors could only be 
determined by the individualized inquiry contemplated by the challenge for cause provisions in the Code" 
(R. v. Pietrangelo ,2001 p. 3). 
79 "The response of the trial judge was to ask the appellant whether he was fit to stand trial. When the 
appellant answered atftrmatively, the trial judge simply indicated that the trial would proceed, but would 
not be thwarted by any tactic such as the appellant's refusal to cross-examine because his witnesses were 
not there" (R. v. Pietrangelo, 2001, p. 4 at 13). 
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Pietrangelo's behaviour does not fit into the notion of a rational and reasonable actor, and 
therefore holding that person culpable (which is the result of the initial trial) is not in 
accordance with the principle of fairness which protects the unfit from being prosecuted 
for something he does not understand and therefore cannot adequately respond to. The 
Appeal court's review of this case, wi1hout directly using these terms, applies concepts of 
rationality and reason to its findings. Pietrangelo's behaviour in court did not appear to be 
rational, and although he gave reasons for his presence in the court system, those reasons 
were not congruent with the actual issue being tried. The original trial's judge seems to 
have been more interested in the maintenance of due process and having a speedy trial 
than in the defendant's welfare. I suggest this because the judge did not hold 
individualized juror inquiries, preferring instead to ask about prejudice and media 
influence of them as a group. He also used the appellant's self assessment of his own 
fitness instead of holding a formal fitness hearing to address the Crown's concern. This 
decision demonstrates some of the conflicting forces at play in the court system since due 
process is also a part of the principle of fairness. 
In the case of R v. Gero (2000), the issue of fitness was raised by the defence 
counsel who had some concerns that his client was not able to adequately communicate 
with him or give him instructions as to the direction or approach he should take on behalf 
of his client. In light of this concern, defence counsel attempted to have his client 
assessed for fitness, but was unsuccessful in accomplishing this task before the trial. 80 
The defence counsel acknowledged 1hat his client understood that he was in court on 
80 Mr. Lister, the accused's lawyer stated to the Court of Appeal: "The reason the matter was adjourned last 
time, sir and the continuing problem I have is my continuing concern as to whether or not he is capable of 
giving me instructions or dealing with this matter" (R. v. Gero, 2000, p. 1). 
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charges of robbery and that his client understood him to be his representative, but the 
defence counsel was not satisfied that his client could instruct him with respect to 
proceeding with the trial. In response to this concern, the trial judge found that the 
accused was satisfactorily fit for trial on the basis that he acknowledged he instructed his 
counsel to appear at the trial and to defend the charge (R. v. Gero 2000, p. 3). Subsequent 
to the trial and prior to the appeal, the appellant was found to suffer from a mental illness 
although it did not render him unfit. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal found that during his trial, the appelhmt Gero 
conducted himself as "coherent and rational" and that although unsuccessful, his defence 
was not abnormal or bizarre (R. v. Gero 2000, 4). The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the 
appellant's fitness, but allowed the appeal because it found that the original trial judge 
should have held an inquiry into the appellant's fitness in order to address defence 
counsel's concerns about his client's fitness. The relevance of this case is that it reveals 
the latitude and flexibility that trial judges haves1 to discern what constitutes fitness 
(within the legal parameters of Section 2 of the Code), and that the failure to ad~ess the 
issue of fitness and his needs with adequate care has the potential to result in a 
miscarriage of justice. Moreover, it appears that the Court of Appeal in this case also uses 
the concepts of rationality and reasonableness to make conclusions about the fitness of an 
individual. 
In this case, the court found the appellant's defence strategy to be a plausible one. 
The defence that was presented to the court was thought to be "normal" in the sense that 
81 "In his response to a request for written submissions, the Appellant emphasizes the considerable 
discretion that is reposed in trial judges in matters of this kind" (R.. v. Gero, 2000,p.4). 
92 
it was reasonable, even ifit was not successful in defending tbe charge. Clearly, the 
success or failure of a defence strategy is separate from the characteristics that define it as 
either rational or irrational and reasonable or unreasonable. In other words, the 
employment of a particular strategy for defence is not the same as its result. This finding 
would indicate that the court determined this defence to be a rational one in that it 
conceivably explains the situation, and also a reasonable one in that the connections or 
steps of the argument of the appellant's defence were not completely incongruent with 
the situation. Although there is no explicit mention of the appellant's court behaviour, the 
characterization of the appellant as "coherent and rational" seems to indicate that he at 
least participated with an expected amount of courtroom decorum. Thus, the absence of 
any significant mention of the appellant's behaviour would indicate that he was stable, 
collected, and level headed (rational), and that he was also agreeable, consistent and 
perhaps exhibited thoughtfulness or reflectivity (reasonable). The Court of Appeal 
allowed an appeal of this case because it is necessary to hold an inquiry into a person's 
fitness if the issue is raised.82 It is important to ensure that an accused individual is 
afforded all of the protections of the law, especially ifher ability to participate adequately 
in the trial process is in question. 
The case of R. v. Xu (2007) has remarkable similarities to the case of R. v. Taylor 
in that the appellant suffered from delusions of a prosecutory nature and also 
82 "Nonetheless, we are of the view that the learned trial judge erred in law in concluding that Mr. Lister's 
affinnative response to the question, "But he has given you instructions to appear at this trial and defend the 
charge?" was dispositive of the fitness issue. In fact, in our respectful opinion, the inquiry was not 
responsive to the "concerns" that Mr. Lister had articulated. 
We are unable to sustain a conviction, even with the concurrence of counsel, where we are persuaded that 
there was a miscarriage of justice attributable to a failure to conduct a proper inquiry on the issue of fitness 
to stand trial. In such circumstances, appellate interference is warranted" (R. v. Gero, 2000, p.4). 
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demonstrated intelligence and coherence in her behaviours aqd speech. But the 
inconsistencies and the contradictions in the law with respect to the unfit are much more 
transparent. 
Ms. Xu had been ordered to undergo a 60 day treatment order to restore her to 
fitness, and although she was declared fit under the parameters of Section 2 of the Code, 
the treatment was not successful in controlling her delusions. These delusions seem to 
stem from a car accident after which she made hundreds of "nonsensical and rambling" 
phone calls to the complainant which did not stop after police wamings that they must. 
Xu's delusions led her to believe that the insurance company (dealing with her accident), 
and the governments of Canada and China were conspiring against her to prevent her 
from receiving the settlement payment due to her from the accident. 
Although her delusions were largely unresponsive to pharmacological treatment, 
Dr. DeFreitas opined that Xu was fit for trial as she met the "limited cognitive capacity 
test" standards that resulted from Taylor. This opinion was supported by another 
psychiatrist, Dr. Wilkie, and after this pronouncement, Xu "commenced a bail hearing." 
Dr. Wilkie's observations of Xu's behaviour during her bail hearing led him to change his 
opinion with respect to her fitness despite her "rudimentary factual understanding of her 
legal predicament" (R v Xu, 2007, p. 3). Although Xu was able to speak intelligibly, her 
delusions rendered her unable to communicate with counsel. It was determined that her 
refusal to cooperate with the court was not volitional, but rather a result of her mental 
disorder. Xu was attempting to demonstrate her mental health by discarding her lawyer: 
"In other words, she is using the court process as a vehicle for the demonstration of her 
sanity" (R v. Xu, 2007, p. 3). 
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In his overview of the case, Justice Schneider makes 1;he comparison to and 
provides a critique of Taylor. He argues that while the court, in rendering its decision in 
Taylor, took into consideration the right to choose one's own defence (which came out of 
R. v. Swain), Schneider points out that this right must be understood as "rational choice" 
(R v. Xu, 2007, p. 5). If the accused does not have a rational understanding of her legal 
predicament, the notion of a right to choose is empty. This way of understanding choice-
making is embedded in the discourse of autonomy. Justice Schneider's argument here is 
that a rational choice is also a product of an autonomous actor who is able to examine the 
possibilities before her and think through the potential consequences of a particular 
course of action. Thus, a rational choice is also a product of an unencumbered thought 
process that allows a person to examine her existential situation and make choices based 
on her own best interest. 
Justice Schneider uses dictionary definitions of the term rational to classify Xu's 
thinking as irrational, thereby reproducing the dichotomy supporting the punishable 
subject. He concludes that Xu's paranoid delusions render her irrational becaus~ she 
becomes "fixated upon irrelevancies that are a direct product of her mental illness." Xu 
"is not able to conduct her own defence... She is motivated by her mental disorder to 
behave within the process in a manner that is not consistent with its objectives" (R v. Xu, 
2007, p. 5). This critique also highlights the need for the participants in the legal process 
to understand it well enough beyond a "limited cognitive" capacity, and to act in 
accordance with its objectives. If the accused cannot adequately participate in the 
process, she should be protected from it. 
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I argue that Justice Schneider's cautionary advice in t\le case of Xu is reflective of 
two things. First, there is a specific way of thinking about the punishable subject that is 
embedded in the assumptions of the law, and second, these assumptions are problematic 
and need to be considered with care so as not to push citizens through the criminal justice 
system when they are incapable of acting in their own best interests because they do not 
understand the process. While Justice Schneider employs a standard dictionary definition 
to make the distinctions between that which is rational and that which is not, I argue that 
he does so to provide a way of demonstrating how the "limited cognitive tesf' is 
inadequate. In the case of Xu, as in the case of Taylor, the accused individuals were 
highly articulate and intelligent, but the approach they took in their defences was 
hampered by mental disorder. While these two accused could easily pass the "limited 
cognitive test", the decisions they were making and the focus of their understanding of 
their circumstances was of such a nature as to be counterproductive to their own best 
interests. 
t' 
The balance here is delicate; the law focuses on the autonomy of the individual, 
but when this autonomy is compromised by mental disorder, it is necessary to prevent the 
law from exacting punishments that would be unfair given the inability of an unfit person 
to adequately respond to the law. Justice Schneider seems keenly aware of this fine point, 
but he does not appear to be offering here a definitive solution to apply to every case. 
Indeed, it does not appear that such a solution is possible to have, for each case before the 
law that raises the issue of fitness is unique. To apply a single solution to such a variety 
of abilities would suggest that fitness can be categorized and defined in a way that reifies 
the binaries offit and unfit. I argue that despite the inability and inappropriateness of a 
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"one size fits all" solution, the issue of fitness needs to be addressed on an individual 
basis. The prevention of the kinds of injustice or potential injustice demonstrated by these 
three cases and the cases of Taylor and Whittle can be had by giving the issue of fitness 
more careful attention. If the issue of fitness is raised for an accused, I think a formal 
inquiry into the matter will help jurists to uphold the principles of autonomy and fairness. 
Being mentally disordered does not automatically make a person unfit for trial, 
but where the issue is raised, a more serious inquiry into the issue than the defendant's 
own self assessment is a more appropriate way to proceed. I argue that tools like the FIT -
R which help to place individuals on a continuum with respect to the ideal individual 
provide a clearer, but not definitive picture of whether or not a person is capable of 
enduring the rigors of the trial process. I do not think that this approach is paternalistic; 
rather I think it helps to preserve the autonomy of the individual. Fitness hearings that 
are tailored to the individual allows for the expression of that individual's unique 
abilities. The Xu and Taylor cases demonstrate that unfit legal subjects have a wide range 
of mental abilities but the possession of them does not readily assist them or prepare them 
for the demands of a criminal trial. 
The case of Pietrange 10 is another significant case of an intelligent yet unfit 
subject. Pietrangelo was aware enough of some of the aspects of participating in a trial as 
his appeal was partially based on a challenge for cause, but the subject of the trial was not 
the issue he insisted on attempting to address. The rationality of a legal subject has 
varying degrees and there does not appear to be a definitive point at which a person can 
be said to be able to meaningfully participate in a trial. The fluctuation in a person's 
mental abilities with respect to the law seems to make the critique of the FIT -R, as put 
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forth by Veiel and Coles (1999, 2001), strong. Fitness is not ~erely a characteristic, but it 
is a combination of abilities that allows a person to meaningfully participate in the legal 
process by making decisions based on an understanding of the nature or object of the 
trial and being able to think through the possible consequences of choosing certain 
defence strategies. Having said this, I do think that tools like the FIT -R can have the 
flexibility to provide jurists and lawyers with an insight as to how a defendant might 
respond to his criminal proceedings. The binruy of fit/unfit may not be entirely eliminated 
here, but an awareness of how it is constructed can lead to a better appreciation of the 
importance of maintaining the same standard of autonomy for evetyone. 
It is apparent from these three cases that some judges do not seem to take the 
problematic nature of fitness into consideration with the kind of care that they should. 
This lack of consideration stems from conflicting goals embedded in the fundamental 
principles upon which the justice system is built. It seems that oftentimes, trial judges 
place more weight on the importance of the expediency of a trial and the issue of due 
r; 
process that is embedded in the fairness principle than a true consideration of fitness. This 
lack of deep consideration of fitness comes at the expense of the notion that one needs to 
understand the process before one can be subject to it and be rendered culpable for her 
actions. The preoccupation with due process reduces fitness issues in their importance, 
and results in the creation of punishable subjects who are held culpable for behaviour 
when they are not in a position to adequately participate in the legal process. 
In reviewing these select cases where fitness is at issue, provincial Courts of 
Appeal have applied concepts of rationality, reasonableness and autonomy_ They look at 
evidence of the behaviours of the appellant during his trial as well as the arguments from 
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both counsel and the reasoning or behaviour of the trial judg~. In cases where the 
behaviour of the defendant / accused is somehow outside of the scope of "normal" 
courtroom decorum, the behaviour is noted in the case as a factor indicating potentials for 
unfitness. The provincial Courts of Appeal are not saying that abnormal behaviour is a 
prerequisite for a fitness hearing or that this kind of behaviour will render a person unfit 
for trial. The indication is that if the issue offitness is raised, a person's courtroom 
behaviour can provide some insight into whether or not he is rational and/or reasonable. 
The analysis of these cases suggests that the "limited cognitive tesf' is problematic 
because it, in an attempt to maintain fundamental principles of justice such as due process 
and trial within a reasonable time, violates other fundamental principles of justice like 
autonomy and fairness. 
In terms of methodology and drawing general conclusions, the selection and small 
sample of cases was drawn because of their relevance to how Taylor and Whittle were 
applied. The cases I examined were appealed and heard by provincial Courts of Appeal. 
There are likely numerous cases that could have been examined, but these case~ were 
chosen as examples of the application of Taylor and Whittle to examine the roles of the 
nature and results of fitness wi1hin the broader legal contexts of rights and principles of 
law. My intention was neither to make broader conclusions about these cases, nor to 
generalize to the wider statistical population of accused. 
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Chapter 6: Drawing Conclusions: 
The purpose of this project has been two-fold: 1) to examine how the law 
responds to the mentally disordered who come into contlict with it, and 2) to see if that 
response is congruent with the notion of social justice. In order to accomplish this, I took 
the discourses of rationality, reasonableness, and culpability as markers for understanding 
who the "ideal" punishable subject is. These discourses, I argue, have had fundamental 
and lasting impacts on our conception of who the "normal" person is and why she is 
someone who is punishable by the law. The focus of this thesis is specific to the idea of 
"fitness to stand trial," since an accused individual's first contact with legal proceedings 
that are designed to determine her guilt or innocence is an interest in whether or not she is 
able to proceed with the trial. While people whose fitness for trial is not at issue proceed 
immediately with their legal dramas, people for whom fitness is an issue find themselves 
scrutinized by the law with the help of the psychiatric institution. This scrutiny is justified 
by the law as a way ofprotecting the unfit from unfair trial proceedings (Davis, 1994, p. 
319). 
Theoretical Considerations: 
In order to accomplish this task, several theoretical areas required exploration. 
Assuming that both criminal justice and social justice are linked by the pursuit of justice, 
I found it necessary to brietly explore what is meant by justice. Ultimately, it appears that 
justice, in a broad sense, is that which makes the distinction between right and wrong 
meaningful. Thus, justice is a moral or ethical concept. Criminal justice, I argue, is 
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concerned with controlling social order so that social life canbe productive and happy83. 
Moreover, the law gets its power by having the ability to punish those people who violate 
it and cause unhappiness within the community. Conceiving the formation of society by 
mutual consent - the social contract - provides the law with the power to punish.84 The 
power to punish serves as an expression of the moral order of society. 85 In contrast, the 
concern of social justice is occupied with alleviating or eliminating inequity among 
individuals whether these issues are of recognition or redistribution (see for instance, 
Fraser, 1995 and Young, 1997). 
The goals of these two branches of justice do not appear to be directly compatible. 
In order to account for the apparent discrepancy, I examined the development of the idea 
of social justice from Adam Smith to Iris Young. From this examination, two important 
and influential concepts emerged, stemming from Immanuel Kant. These concepts were 
the ideas of rationality and equality. Kant argued, following an historical tradition 
stemming from Aristotle86, that human beings are rational creatures. Moreover, for Kant, 
being rational creatures means that human beings are equal creatures and as such deserve 
to be treated equally with respect (Kant, 1988, pp. 25, 60). Hence, the Categorical 
Imperative became a foundation on which the "equal and absolute worth of every 
individual" (Flieschaker, 2004, p. 72) would be respected. This idea became a foundation 
83 This function is justified by Utilitarianism, a theory that the greatest good for the greatest number is the 
most just way to promote human good (Mill, 2000, p. 173). See also Garland, 1990, p. 57. 
84 The idea of a social contract has its roots in Plato's Crito where Socrates argued that being a part ofa 
community after reaching an age to make the choice is an indication of one's assent to the law and its 
power (Plato, 2002). This notion has been further refined by John Locke (1995) who argued that the social 
contract is one that prevents individuals from taking vengeance on those people who are perceived to 
have wronged them (Locke, 1995, pp. 350-352). See also Markus Drubber, 1998. 
85 For example, "Durkheim conceives of punishment as a straightforward embodiment of society's moral 
order ... " (Garland, 1990, p. 25). 
86 Aristotle (1999) argued that the distinguishing feature of human beings from other animals is their 
rational faculty. 
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for secular justice and is an important Enlightenment ideal. The theory of impartiality that 
comes from these ideals suggests that moral principles can be applied in an objective 
fashion to all people using the same basic formulas, thus promoting fairness. The law 
works on this principle of impartiality and its two main tenants, innocence until proven 
guilty and the presumption of fitness, stem from it. But this kind of "impartiality" is not 
without its criticisms. Iris Young (1990) offers a scathing critique of this Enlightenment 
principle. She claims that this "logic of identity" is a way of refusing to acknowledge 
differences among people by "think[ing] things together ... conceptualiz[ing] entities in 
terms of substance instead of process or relation ... " (Young I. M., 1997, p. 98). Using the 
"logic of identity" then, creates binaries like goodlbad, fit/unfit, health/sickness, and the 
like, and fails to see that there is a continuum on which things can be understood. 
In order to undertake the task of understanding how and where, if at all, criminal 
justice and social justice intersect, I selected the idea of trial fitness as a specific area of 
focus. This site of inquiry is only one of several that could be used to examine the 
intersection of criminal and social justice. Some of the other sites of inquiry coJld 
include, race, gender, and ethnicity. Examining fitness however, contributes to a broader 
understanding of inequalities within criminal and social justice. Moreover, this selection 
provides an entrance into some of the fundamental principles at play in the law, namely, 
autonomy, welfare, and fairness. These principles are not only concerns for criminal 
justice, but they are also, more broadly, the concerns of social justice. Trial fitness is 
specifically concerned with these fundamental and foundational principles of the law. 
The law purports to support the autonomy of the people over whom it rules by providing 
acceptable limitations on social life presumably agreed upon by mutual agreement. By 
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doing so, the law also promotes the welfare of communities, ~ince people agree abide by 
the law's rules in order to make their communal living more productive and enjoyable. 
Finally, the law offers itself as a set of fair rules, rules that because they are assented to, 
are common goals to all community members and can therefore be applied with 
impartiality to those community members. The criminal justice system, however, has 
found that impartiality is unrealistic, and that the actors to which it applies must meet 
certain criteria; otherwise, it finds itself in violation of these principles. 
The kind of actor that the law assumes to be governed by it is one that is rational, 
reasonable, and therefore culpable. The assumption of this kind of actor reinforces certain 
kinds of binaries: normalcy/deviance, fit/unfit, goodlbad, and I use the discourses of the 
rational, reasonable and culpable to uncover these binaries. Thus, my investigation is 
critical discourse analysis since language has the power to construct reality and provide it 
'th f 87 WI a sense 0 permanence. 
In Chapter two, I examine the development of the discourses of the rational, 
~ 
reasonable, and culpable. I argue that the law's assumptions about human nature set up an 
understanding of the human being as having static, measurable and binaty characteristics 
of free/determined (autonomy), responsible/not responsible (culpability), thinking/not 
thinking (rational), and reasonable/unreasonable. Moreover, the law assumes the actors 
over whom it rules to be free, thinking, reasonable and responsible choice-makers. This 
assumption allows the law to presume the fitness of people and helps to justify its ability 
to punish by treating those who come into conflict with it equally. 
87 "As human beings we construct a language of communication charged with the moral meaning of our 
being. The categories of human language contain and presuppose definite forms of life" (Quinney, 1999, 
p.74). 
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I argue that 'the concept of fitness is predicated on thr~ discourses: rationality, 
reasonableness, and culpability. These discourses identify specific characteristics of the 
actions performed by punishable sUbjects. If an actor is assumed to be rational and 
reasonable, then he can be held culpable for actions that hann others. An investigation 
into what exactly these discourses are and how they relate not only to the principles of 
autonomy and welfare, but how they are found in the law and in psychiatry became 
important. 
One of the foundational principles oflaw, according to Ashworth (2006), is that 
of the autonomy of the individual. This principle states, "that each individual should be 
treated as responsible for his or her own behaviour'" (Ashworth, 2006, p. 25). This 
principle is embraced by classic criminology and is best attributed to Caesar Becarria 
(1880). Treating the individual as responsible for her own actions demonstrates respect 
for her as a choice-maker and encourages the moral agency of individuals (Ashworth, 
2006, p. 26). But autonomy is not the only foundational principle in the law; welfare too, 
is a principle that has import. While individuals are thought to be autonomous, Ihere is no 
denying that they are also social creatures who must find ways to exist (generally in 
communities) with one another. As social creatures, human beings must find ways to 
cooperate with one another and ensure the welfare of their social situations. As a set of 
rules of conduct, the law helps to facilitate the welfare of all community members by 
preventing and/or punishing those people who disrupt communal hannony. It is assumed 
that "individual[s] shall be able to discriminate between right and wrong ... " (Farrar, 1930, 
p. 440) and conduct themselves accordingly. 
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Embedded in the concept of autonomy is an importan~ notion of responsibility. 
The value of this concept is best demonstrated by existentialist philosophy where the full 
scope of a person's responsibility is drawn out. Jean-Paul Sartre (1975) declares that 
humans are special in that they do not have a particular purpose for which they are 
innately designed. He claims that we are like works in progress, our choices giving our 
art the details (Sartre, 1975). While humans are always grappling with making 
themselves, Sartre (1975) is adamant that our choices are not only a reflection of 
ourselves, but of how we think humankind in general should be (Sartre, 1975, p. 350). 
The result of this line of thinking is an emphasis on the responsibility that comes with 
making choices whether or not the consequences are foreseen. 
David Harvey (1993) makes Sartre's ideas more clear. He too acknowledges the 
individuating life experiences of the human, but he is careful to point out that humans 
share the same kinds of conditions of being in the world. He writes, "Individuals are 
heterogeneously constructed subjects, internalizing 'otherness' by virtue of their relations 
.' 
to the world" (Harvey, 1993, p. 58). Thus, we are shaped and changed by the dynamics 
and fluidity of the social, and in tum, we shape and change the world through our 
meaning-making activities. The existential position is an endorsement of the principle of 
autonomy - emphasizing the human ability to make choices and take responsibility for 
them, and also recognizing the fact that humans are not isolated creatures, that humans 
live in a world with one another and their shared condition is what helps them to 
recognize the need to take responsibility for their choices. The emphasis on autonomy 
and the assumption that humans are free, capable, choice-makers leads to an insistence 
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that persons accept responsibility for their actions and be held culpable for them in the 
eyes of the community. 
As a distinguishing characteristic of the human being (Aristotle, 1999, p. 9), 
rationality is an important discourse for this project. The rational actor demonstrates 
several key abilities; he is "response-able,,88, able to provide plausible arguments for 
engaging in certain courses of action, has an awareness of time and place, and is able to 
logically connect events together. These characteristics are assumed by the law as normal 
to the punishable subject. 
Analysing Fitness: 
Once the legal criteria were examined, I wanted to know how a person could be 
assessed for fitness. Ultimately, ajudge makes the decision as to whether or not a person 
meets the legal criteria outlined above, but psychiatrists and psychologists (Viljoen, 
Ogloff, & Zapf, 2003) are often called upon to evaluate a person's mental condition and 
used as "expert witnesses." The tool that I examined in this endeavour is the Fitness 
hIterview Test - Revised. I chose this tool because its initial design was specific to the 
Canadian legal realm and the revised edition reflects the changes embodied by Bill C-lO 
in 1992. 
hI Chapter 3, I take the concepts of rationality, reasonableness, and culpability 
and trace them through the FIT -R. I argue that these concepts are embedded in our 
concept of the fit person and that they playa significant role in the way we determine 
whether or not a person is fit for trial. I argue that the discourse of the rational entails 
88 1n order to be "response-ableR a person's actions are viewed in light of his ability to understand, engage 
in, and respond to his environment. (Ericson, 1975). 
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several key abilities including the abilities to be logical, justify arguments, and plausibly 
explain actions or events to another person. Behavioural cues of the rational person 
include being collected, impartial, sensible, reflective, systematic and analytical. The 
FIT - R provides the evaluee with opportunities to demonstrate his abilities as a rational 
(thinking) being as it asks several questions that require the respondent to explain, 
provide an account o( or justify actions, and explain them in a logical and impartial 
fashion. In the course of the evaluation, the FIT -R seeks to determine how reasonable the 
evaluee is. 
The discourse of the reasonable is difficult to distinguish from that of the rational, 
but I argue that the reasonable subject can make connections, identify steps/stages of an 
event, and think them through. I argue that this process does not have to be based in logic 
in the way the discourse of rationality would demand. The way a person makes 
connections between steps and stages reveals something about his ability to reason and 
how his thought processes are employed. The behavioural characteristics of a reasonable 
subject include being agreeable, perceptive, thoughtful, consistent, and reflective. 
The discourses of the reasonable and the rational are hallmarks of the "fit" or 
"normal" and therefore punishable subject. Possessing these qualities lays the foundation 
for holding her culpable for her actions. The FIT -R seeks to determine how the evaluee 
sees herself as a culpable subject and it does so by asking questions that get the 
respondent to specifically identify herself in relation to her own culpability. The 
questions that reflect the idea of culpability in the FIT -R provide the evaluator with an 
idea of the respondent's self perception of his culpability or blameworthiness. 
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Important aspects of autonomy and fairness are revealed by the discourses of the 
rational, reasonable and culpable. The rational person is a logical thinker who makes 
choices and can justify them. The reasonable person is able to connect steps together and 
think them through. These traits are extremely important to the idea of autonomy. The 
autonomous person examines options, weighs consequences and chooses a course of 
action. Jeremy Bentham (2000) thought that people were mainly hedonistic, and self 
interested. He argued that people need to be curbed from harming others by making 
punishments more painful than the pleasure that could be gained from injurious actions 
(Bentham, 2000). Thus the ideas embedded in existentialism come to play in the 
understanding of the autonomous subject (i.e. choice-making, weighing options, acting in 
one's best interest). 
Fitness in Practice: 
Having explored the legal criteria for fitness and one way that fitness can be 
evaluated, I turned my attention in Chapter 4 to two precedent setting cases in Canadian 
g 
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legal history to see how the discourses of the rational, reasonable and culpable play out in 
the courtroom. The two cases I chose wereR. v. Taylor (1992) andR. v. Whittle (1994). 
Both of these cases came after the groundbreaking case of R. v. Swain (1990) in which 
the Court reaffirmed the rights of a fit accused to choose his own defence (regardless of 
whether or not it serves his best interests). This decision also reinforced the principle of 
autonomy in Canadian law. 
The law has provisions within it to deal with the accused person whose actions are 
thought to be performed unknowingly, out of duress, and the like. The justification for 
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these provisions is that only an actor who fully intends his ac:tions can be truly held 
culpable for them. Thus, an actor whose intentions are somehow impaired is not held to 
the same kind of accountability as someone whose actions are not (although it is clear 
that self-induced circumstances of impairment - drunkenness, for example - are not 
excused in terms of culpability~. The case of Taylor established the "limited cognitive 
capacity test" whereby it is only necessary for an accused person to have only the most 
rudimentary understanding of the trial, its proceedings and possible outcomes. It is not 
necessary for the accused to be able to process his circumstances and foresee varying 
possible outcomes; he only needs to know that punishment may be an outcome of the 
proceedings. Further, the case of Whittle expanded the legal criteria of "limited cognitive 
ability" to encompass decision making abilities prior to trial, i.e. while in police custody. 
The case of Taylor was initially tried in 1988 and Taylor was found not guilty by 
reason of insanity and was remanded into custody. After the case of Swain (1990), 
Taylor's case was reopened because the Crown had raised the issue of insanity. During 
his appeal, psychiatric evidence indicated that Taylor was suffering from paran0i<i 
schizophrenia and was thought to be unable to instruct counsel because he had paranoid 
delusions that led him to believe there was a legal conspiracy at work around him. During 
his fitness hearing, Taylor insisted on testifying against the advice of his counsel who 
argued that while he could meet the basic fitness requirements, he would be "unable to 
instruct counsel in a manner that would be in his best interests" (R v. Taylor, 1992). This 
argument was accepted by Justice Wren and the Ontario Criminal Court Review Board 
agreed with this decision in May 1992. In the end, however, the appeal of Taylor's case 
89 "Disease of the mind" has been given the following definition by Justice Dickson in Cooperv. The Queen 
{1979}: " ... any illness, disorder, or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning, 
excluding however, self induced states caused by alcohol or drugs .•. " (Roach, 2004, p. 256). 
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resulted in the "limited cognitive capacity test" whereby a person's abilities to act in his 
own best interests is not relevant to the determination of fitness. The court justified this 
position by declaring that any higher threshold of fitness would be contrary to the idea of 
due process (R v. Taylor, 1992) since adopting too high a threshold would result in more 
people being declared unfit for trial. 
I argue that the Court's reasoning to maintain a "limited" test is problematic. The 
lowering of the thresho ld for the mentally disordered in order to include them in the 
categOlY of "fit" (and thereby punishable) is contrary to the principles of justice. I argue 
that "fit" persons are presumed to have a basic understanding of court proceedings and 
are able to participate in their trials in a meaningful way. But "fit" persons are also 
assumed to have an ability to act autonomously by choosing strategies that are in their 
own best interests. The threshold of cognitive capacity for non-mentally disordered 
accused persons, then, in reality, is much higher than that outlined by the "limited 
cognitive capacity" requirement sketched out in Taylor. 
The case of Whittle (1994) is significant because it establishes that the "operating 
mind test" is essentially the same as the "limited cognitive test" and therefore widens the 
scope of fitness to include competency to waive counsel and to waive the right to silence 
in pre-trial legal proceedings. Distinctions between "adjudicative competence" and 
"decisional competence" as outlined in Slobogin (2006) demonstrate why the conflation 
between the operating mind test and the limited cognitive test are problematic. These two 
types of competence are distinguished as follows: 
Adjudicative competency requires that the person understand 
the criminal process and be able to communicate relevant facts 
to the players in the system .... Decisional com.petence, in contrast, 
is only required when the defendant is entitled to make a decision 
about his or her case, such as whether to plead guilty 
(Slobogin, 2006, p. 192). 
no 
While there might be a rudimentary understanding of what is happening prior to 
trial (i.e. while in police custody), not being able to act in one's own best interests during 
this time can have significant ramifications for how the trial later proceeds. The "limited 
cognitive" test reduces decision making to a mere understanding of the criminal justice 
process and the ability to relate facts to a lawyer. This means that a person's decisional 
competence is neglected in favour of a more rudimentary fitness that may render more 
people punishable by understanding them as fit. I argue that acting in one's own best 
interest is a reflection of one's autonomy and that conflating a mere understanding of the 
judicial process with the ability to make decisions is highly problematic. This conflation 
diminishes the importance of autonomy despite this foundational principle having utmost 
importance in the conception of the human being. The principle autonomy is one that has 
provided respect for persons as rational creatures and supplied dignity to the ethical 
realm. The violation of this principle with respect to the mentally disordered denies the 
mentally disordered their dignity and further emphasizes their deviant status. 
The difficulties outlined above carry into cases of fitness after Taylor and 
Whittle. In Chapter 5, I explore three cases where fitness is at issue. In the cases of R. v. 
Pietrangelo (2001), R. v. Gero (2000) and R. v. Xu (2007) the issue of trial fitness 
brought them before the Court of Appeal. While all three cases had defendants who 
appeared to possess rational and reasonable faculties, their use of those faculties seems to 
have been employed in ways that were contrary to the nature and object of the 
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proceedings. In these three cases, the Court of Appeal dete~ed that a more in depth 
inquiry into the defendant's fitness was required by the original trial. 
In the case ofR. v. Xu (2007), Justice Schneider provides a critique of fitness to 
stand trial. He argues that the right to choose one's own defence must be understood as a 
rational one. That is, if a person does not have a rational understanding ofher legal 
predicament, choosing a defence strategy is void of meaning. Justice Schneider is arguing 
that rational choice making is the product of an autonomous actor who is able to examine 
her existential situation, weigh the various choices before her and make a decision based 
on her own best interests. In other words, a person needs to be "response-able" in order 
for her participation in a trial to be meaningful and for the outcome of the trial to be just. 
The achievement of this goal is one that presents no easy solutions. I argue that 
Justice Schneider raises the difficulty of ensuring that defendants are able to assess their 
existential situations and act in their own best interests. He does not offer a "one size fits 
all" solution, and indeed, there does not appear to be such a solution that would not 
r; 
reproduce binaries. Even the process of assessing fitness is mired in these binaries, and I 
argue in Chapter 5 that it may not be possible to completely eliminate them. However, as 
I noted in Chapter 2, the deconstruction of binaries is temporary and incomplete. The 
process of deconstruction then, serves to bring to light "incompletely and temporarily ... 
how legal arguments often disguise ideological positions" (Arrigo, 2003, p. 62). 
Theoretically, then, this thesis serves to demonstrate how the discourses of 
rationality, reasonableness and culpability are at work in the law as they work together 
and support one another in the construction of the fit and ideal punishable subject. The 
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law itself assumes the fitness of individuals in the same way it assumes their innocence 
and their sanity and these assumptions allow it to apply itself to citizens equally. But the 
mentally disordered do not neatly fit into this dichotomy and the law finds that it is 
necessary to make provisions in order to avoid unjustly punishing them. The attempt to 
accommodate difference here becomes problematic as finding the limitations of just "how 
much" one can be mentally disordered before participating in the legal process becomes 
detrimental to the fundamental pursuit of justice. Canada's answer to this dilemma is the 
"limited cognitive" test, but as revealed in Chapters 4 and 5, this test does not prevent a 
mentally disordered individual from being tried and punished when he does not have the 
autonomy to act in his own best interests. The small sample of cases I have presented in 
these two chapters are not meant to be representative of wider populations of accused 
people, rather they demonstrate some of the ways fitness has been handled in the wake of 
Taylor and Whittle and serve as an indication of the need to further investigate the issue 
of trial fitness. The valuation of autonomy, fairness, and welfare is compromised by the 
widening of the scope of what it means to be fit by lowering the thresholds of rationality 
and reasonableness via the limited cognitive test. 
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Appendix A 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. 
Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure. 
Everyone has the right not to be 
arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. 
Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention 
(a) to be informed promptly of the 
reasons therefore; 
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without 
delay and to be informed of that right; 
and 
(c) to have the validity of the aetention 
deterinined by way of habeas corpus 
and to be released if the detention is 
not lawful. 
Any person charged with an offence has 
the right 
(a) to be informed without unreasonable 
delay of the specific offence; 
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time; 
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in 
proceedings against that person in 
respect of the offence; 
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty according to law in a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal; 
Treatment or punishment 12. 
Self-crimination 13. 
I uterp rete I' 14. 
(e) not to be denied reasonable bail 
without just cause; 
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(f) except in the case of an offence under 
military law tried before a military 
tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury 
where the maximum punishment for 
the offence is imprisonment for five 
years or a more severe punishment; 
(g) not to be found guilty on account of 
any act or omission unless, at the time 
of the act or omission, it constituted 
an offence under Canadian or 
intemationallaw or was criminal 
according to the general principles of 
law recognized by the community of 
nations; 
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not 
to be tried for it again and, iffinally 
found guilty and punished for the 
offence, not to be tried or punished 
for it again; and 
(i) if found guilty of the offence and if 
the punishment for the offence has 
been varied between the time of 
commission and the time of 
sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser 
punishment. 
Everyone has the right not to be 
subjected to any cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment. 
A witness who testifies in any 
proceedings has the right not to have any 
incriminating evidence so given used to 
incriminate that witness in any other 
proceedings, except in a prosecution for 
peIjury or for the giving of contradictOIY 
evidence. 
A party or witness in any proceedings 
who does not understand or speak the 
language in which the proceedings are 
conducted or who is deaf has the right to 
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the assistance of an interpreter. 
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Appendix B 
Mental Health Act 
RS.O. 1990, CHAPTERM.7 
Consolidation Period: From November 1, 2004 to the e-Laws currency date. 
Last amendment: 2004, c.3, Sched.A, s.90. 
Application for psychiatric assessment 
15.(1 )Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person, 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily harm to 
himself or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or is 
causing another person to fear bodily harm from him or her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or herself, 
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person is apparently suffering 
from mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in, 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
( e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
(f) serious physical impairment of the person, 
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a psychiatric assessment of 
the person. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 15 (1); 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (1). 
Same 
(1.1 )Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person, 
(a) has previously received treatment for mental disorder of an ongoing or recurring 
nature that, when not treated, is of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious 
bodily harm to the person or to another person or substantial mental or physical 
deterioration of the person or serious physical impairment of the person; and 
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(b) has shown clinical improvement as a result of the treatment, 
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person, 
(c) is apparently suffering from the same mental disorder as the one for which he or she 
previously received treatment or from a mental disorder that is similar to the previous 
one; 
(d) given the person's history of mental disorder and current mental or physical 
condition, is likely to cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person 
or is likely to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration or serious physical 
impairment; and 
(e) is incapable, within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, of consenting 
to his or her treatment in a psychiatric facility and the consent of his or her substitute 
decision-maker has been obtained, 
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a psychiatric assessment of 
the person. 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (2). 
Contents of application 
(2)An application under subsection (1) or (1.1) shall set out clearly that the physician who 
signs the application personally examined the person who is the subject of the application 
and made careful inquiry into all of the facts necessary for him or her to form his or her 
opinion as to the nature and quality of the mental disorder of the person. R.S.O. 1990, 
c. M.7, s. 15 (2); 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (3). 
Idem 
(3)A physician who signs an application under subsection (1) or (1.1 ), 
(a) shall set out in the application the facts upon which he or she formed his or her 
opinion as to the nature and quality of the mental disorder; 
(b) shall distinguish in the application between the facts observed by him or her and the 
facts communicated to him or her by others; and 
(c) shall note in the application the date on which he or she examined the person who is 
the subject of the application. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 15 (3); 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (4). 
Signing of application 
(4)An application under subsection (1) or (1.1) is not effective unless it is signed by the 
physician within seven days after he or she examined the person who is the subject of the 
examination. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 15 (4); 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (5). 
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Authority of application 
(5)An application under subsection (1) or (1.1) is sufficient authority for seven days from 
and including the day on which it is signed by the physician, 
(a) to any person to take the person who is the subject of the application in custody to a 
psychiatric facility forthwith; and 
(b) to detain the person who is the subject of the application in a psychiatric facility and 
to restrain, observe and examine him or her in the facility for not more than 72 hours. 
RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 15 (5); 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (6). 
Justice of the peace's order for psychiatric examination 
16.(I)Where information upon oath is brought before ajustice of the peace that a person 
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the justice, 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily harm to 
himself or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or is 
causing another person to fear bodily harm from him or her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or herself, 
and in addition based upon the information before him or her the justice of the peace has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person is apparently suffering from mental disorder 
of a nature or quality that likely will result in, 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
( e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
(f) serious physical impairment of the person, 
the justice of the peace may issue an order in the prescribed form for the examination of 
the person by a physician. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 16 (1); 2000, c. 9, s. 4 (1). 
Same 
(1.1 )Where information upon oath is brought before a justice of the peace that a person 
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the justice, 
(a) has previously received treatment for mental disorder of an ongoing or recurring 
nature that, when not treated, is of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious 
bodily harm to the person or to another person or substantial ~ental or physical 
deterioration of the person or serious physical impainnent of the person; and 
(b) has shown clinical improvement as a result of the treatment, 
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and in addition based upon the infonnation before him or her the justice of the peace has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person, 
(c) is apparently suffering from the same mental disorder as the one for which he or she 
previously received treatment or from a mental disorder that is similar to the previous 
one; 
(d) given the person's history of mental disorder and current mental or physical 
condition, is likely to cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person 
or is likely to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration or serious physical 
impainnent; and 
(e) is apparently incapable, within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, of 
consenting to his or her treatment in a psychiatric facility and the consent of his or her 
substitute decision-maker has been obtained, 
the justice of the peace may issue an order in the prescribed fonn for the examination of 
the person by a physician. 2000, c. 9, s. 4 (2). 
Idem 
(2)An order under this section may be directed to all or any police officers of the locality 
within which the justice has jurisdiction and shall name or otherwise describe t~e person 
with respect to whom the order has been made. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 16 (2); 2000, c. 9, 
s. 4 (3). 
Authority of order 
(3)An order under this section shall direct, and, for a period not to exceed seven days 
from and including the day that it is made, is sufficient authority for any police officer to 
whom it is addressed to take the person named or described therein in custody forthwith 
to an appropriate place where he or she may be detained for examination by a physician. 
R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 16 (3); 2000, c. 9, s. 4 (4). 
Manner of bringing infonnation before justice 
(4)Forthe purposes of this section, infonnation shall be brought before ajustice of the 
peace in the prescribed manner. 2000, c. 9, s. 4 (5). 
Action by police officer 
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17.Where a police officer has reasonable and probable groufl(,is to believe that a person is 
acting or has acted in a disorderly manner and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person, 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily harm to 
himself or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or is 
causing another person to fear bodily harm from him or her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or herself, 
and in addition the police officer is of the opinion that the person is apparently suffering 
from mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in, 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
( e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
(f) serious physical impairment of the person, 
and that it would be dangerous to proceed under section 16, the police officer may take 
the person in custody to an appropriate place for examination by a physician. 2000, c. 9, 
s.5. 
Place ofpsychiatric examination 
18.An examination under section 16 or 17 shall be conducted by a physician forthwith 
after receipt of the person at the place of examination and where practicable th~place 
shall be a psychiatric facility or other health facility. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 18. 
Change from informal or voluntary patient to involuntary patient 
19.5ubject to subsections 20 (1.1) and (5), the attending physician may change the status 
of an informal or voluntary patient to that of an involuntary patient by completing and 
filing with the officer in charge a certificate of involuntary admission. RS.O. 1990, 
c. M.7, s. 19; 2000, c. 9, s. 6. 
Duty of attending physician 
20.(1 )The attending physician, after observing and examining a person who is the subject 
of an application for assessment under section 15 or who is the subject of an order under 
section 32, 
(a) shall release the person from the psychiatric facility if the attending physician is of the 
opinion that the person is not in need of the treatment provided in a psychiatric facility; 
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(b) shall admit the person as an informal or voluntary patien~ if the attending physician is 
of the opinion that the person is suffering from mental disorder of such a nature or quality 
that the person is in need of the treatment provided in a psychiatric facility and is suitable 
for admission as an informal or voluntary patient; or 
(c) shall admit the person as an involuntary patient by completing and filing with the 
officer in charge a certificate of involuntary admission if the attending physician is of the 
opinion that the conditions set out in subsection (1.1) or (5) are met. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, 
s. 20 (1); 2000, c. 9, s. 7 (1). 
Conditions for involuntary admission 
(1.1 )The attending physician shall complete a certificate of involuntary admission or a 
certificate of renewal if, after examining the patient, he or she is of the opinion that the 
patient, 
(a) has previously received treatment for mental disorder of an ongoing or recurring 
nature that, when not treated, is of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious 
bodily harm to the person or to another person or substantial mental or physical 
deterioration of the person or serious physical impairment of the person; 
(b) has shown clinical improvement as a result of the treatment; 
(c) is suffering from the same mental disorder as the one for which he or she previously 
received treatment or from a mental disorder that is similar to the previous one; 
(d) given the person's history of mental disorder and current mental or physical 
condition, is likely to cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person 
or is likely to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration or serious physical 
impairment; 
(e) has been found incapable, within the meaning of the Health Care ConsentAct, 1996, 
of consenting to his or her treatment in a psychiatric facility and the consent of his or her 
substitute decision-maker has been obtained; and 
(f) is not suitable for admission or continuation as an informal or voluntary patient. 2000, 
c. 9, s. 7 (2). 
Physician who completes certificate of involuntary admission 
(2)The physician who completes a certificate of involuntary admission pursuant to clause 
(1) (c) shall not be the same physician who completed the application for psychiatric 
assessment under section 15. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (2). 
Release of person by officer in charge 
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(3)The officer in charge shall release a person who is the subject of an application for 
assessment under section 15 or who is the subject of an order under section 32 upon the 
completion of 72 hours of detention in the psychiatric facility unless the attending 
physician has released the person, has admitted the person as an informal or voluntary 
patient or has admitted the person as an involuntary patient by completing and filing with 
the officer in charge a certificate ofinvoluntary admission. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (3). 
Authority of certificate 
(4)An involuntary patient may be detained, restrained, observed and examined in a 
psychiatric facility, 
(a) for not more than two weeks under a certificate of involuntary admission; and 
(b) for not more than, 
(i) one additional month under a first certificate of renewal, 
(ii) two additional months under a second certificate of renewal, and 
(iii) three additional months under a third or subsequent certificate of renewal, 
that is completed and filed with the officer in charge by the attending physician. R S. O. 
1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (4). 
Conditions for involuntary admission 
(5)The attending physician shall complete a certificate of involuntary admission or a 
certificate of renewal if, after examining the patient, he or she is of the opinionc;both, 
(a) that the patient is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will 
result in, 
(i) serious bodily harm to the patient, 
(ii) serious bodily harm to another person, or 
(iii) serious physical impairment of the patient, 
unless the patient remains in the custody of a psychiatric facility; and 
(b) that the patient is not suitable for admission or continuation as an informal or 
voluntary patient. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (5); 2000, c. 9, s. 7 (3,4). 
Change of status, where period of detention has expired 
(6)An involuntaxy patient whose authorized period of detention has expired shall be 
deemed to be an informal orvoluntaxy patient. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (6). 
Idem, where period of detention has not expired 
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(7)An involuntaxy patient whose authorized period of detention has not expired may be 
continued as an informal or voluntaxy patient upon completion of the approved form by 
the attending physician. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (7); 2000, c. 9, s. 7 (5). 
Examination of certificate by officer in charge 
(8)Forthwith following completion and filing ofa certificate ofinvoluntaxy admission or 
of a certificate of renewal, the officer in charge or his or her delegate shall review the 
certification documents to ascertain whether or not they have been completed in 
compliance with the criteria outlined in this Act and where, in his or her opinion, the 
documents are not properly completed, the officer in charge shall so inform the attending 
physician and, unless the person is re-examined and released or admitted in accordance 
with this section, the officer in charge shall release the person. RS. O. 1990, c. M. 7, 
s. 20 (8); 2000, c. 9, s. 7 (6). 
Judge's order for examination 
21.(1 )Where a judge has reason to believe that a person who appears before him or her 
charged with or convicted of an offence suffers from mental disorder, the judge may 
order the person to attend a psychiatric facility fur examination. 
Senior physician's report 
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(2)Where an examination is made under this section, the senior physician shall report in 
writing to the judge as to the mental condition of the person. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 21. 
Judge's order for admission 
22.(1 )Where ajudge has reason to believe that a person in custody who appears before 
him or her charged with an offence suffers from mental disorder, the judge may, by order, 
remand that person for admission as a patient to a psychiatric facility for a period of not 
more than two months. 
Senior physician's report 
(2)Before the expiration of the time mentioned in such order, the senior physician shall 
report in writing to the judge as to the mental condition of the person. RS.O. 1990, 
c. M.7, s. 22. 
Condition precedent to judge's order 
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23.A judge shall not make an order under section 21 or 22 until he or she ascertains from 
the senior physician of a psychiatric facility that the services of the psychiatric facility are 
available to the person to be named in the order. RS.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 23. 
Contents of senior physician's report 
24.Despite this or any other Act or any regulation made under any other Act, the senior 
physician may report all or any part of the information compiled by the psychiatric 
facility to any person where, in the opinion of the senior physician, it is in the best 
interests of the person who is the subject of an order made under section 21 or 22. RS.O. 
1990, c. M.7, s. 24. 
Detention under the Criminal Code (Canada) 
25.Any person who is detained in a psychiatric facility under Part XX. 1 of the Criminal 
Code (Canada) may be restrained, observed and examined under this Act and provided 
with treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996. 2000, c. 9, s. 8. 
Communications to and from patients 
